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A NEW PARADIGM FOR CONSERVATION OF 
GREAT WHALES IN THE URBAN SEA OF 
THE UNITED STATES—SPECIES IN NEED 
OF A “GREEN KNIGHT” 
Richard Max Strahan*
Abstract: The great whales of the North Atlantic live, breed, and are now 
being injured and killed in the “Urban Sea” —a growing feature of the 
United States coastline resulting from coastal development. The primary 
threats to great whales are anthropogenic: vessel strikes and entangle-
ment in commercial fishing gear. Despite their popularity as cultural 
icons, and federal and state protective regulations on the books, endan-
gered whales increasingly suffer collateral damage from coastal com-
merce. Ample law and technology exist to eliminate these problems. 
Rather than advancing the protection of whales, however, government 
agencies and some nonprofit organizations have aggravated the problem 
through their lack of meaningful action. This essay examines systemic 
reasons why harmful entanglements in commercial fishing gear continue 
to occur and are likely to go on unabated into the future. The essay then 
proposes a paradigm shift for approaching these problems that will pro-
tect whales and will also benefit other wildlife in the ocean and its coastal 
Urban Sea. 
                                                                                                                      
* Founder and chief science officer of Whale Safe USA, a citizen organization that 
aims to protect the ocean environment by encouraging state and federal governments to 
establish a “whale safe” environmental review standard for their licensing and regulating 
of commercial and industrial activities that occur in the marine environment or affect 
it—including commercial fishing and commercial whale watch tourism. The author has 
litigated a number of marine mammal protection lawsuits as a non-attorney plaintiff pro 
se. See Strahan v. Holmes, 595 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D. Mass. 2009); Man Against Extinction 
v. Hall, No. C 08-01488 SI, 2008 WL 3549197 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2008); Strahan v. 
Pritchard, 473 F. Supp. 2d 230 (D. Mass. 2007); Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. 581 (D. 
Mass. 1997), aff’d, 187 F.3d 623 (1st Cir. 1998); Strahan v. Coxe, 939 F. Supp. 963 (D. 
Mass. 1996), aff’d, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997); Bays’ Legal Fund v. Browner, 828 F. 
Supp. 102 (D. Mass. 1993). 
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Introduction 
 The status of the great whales1 in law and biology makes it fitting 
to describe them as “Twenty-Ton Canaries.” Like the small, sensitive 
birds that warned miners of lethal odorless gases in the coal mines of 
the 19th century, the great whales in effect serve a utilitarian function, 
warning the public of imminent environmental dangers in the coastal 
environment. Today, most deaths and injuries of great whales are 
caused by humans, and occur in two settings—the diminishing killing 
of whales by a very few nations’ whaling fleets,2 and the dramatically 
increasing harms collateral to the growing development and industri-
alization of the coastal marine environment of the United States and 
other nations.3
 Today the number of great whales killed by Japan’s small hunting 
fleet is dwarfed by the collateral killing of these whales along the coast-
line of the United States from commercial and industrial activity. Coastal 
marine fisheries in the United States and Canada routinely kill and in-
jure great whales by entangling them in commercial fishing gear—the 
                                                                                                                      
1 The term “great whales” typically refers to the baleen whales and the sperm whale. 
John Bannister, Great Whales 3 (2008). The North Atlantic right whale (Eubalaena gla-
cialis), the southern right whale (Eubalaena australis), the North Pacific right whale 
(Eubalaena japonica), the humpback whale (Megaptera novaeangliae), the fin whale (Balaenop-
tera physalus), the sei whale (Balaenoptera borealis), the sperm whale (Physeter catodon), and the 
blue whale (Balaenoptera musculus) are listed as protected species under the federal Endan-
gered Species Act. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2008). In 
2008 the National Marine Fisheries Service divided the previously listed single species known 
as the northern right whale (Eubalaena glacialis) into two separate species, the North Atlantic 
right whale (Eubalaena glacialis) and the North Pacific right whale (Eubalaena japonica). En-
dangered Status for North Pacific and North Atlantic Right Whales, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,024 
(March 6, 2008). The author has disputed the validity of this division in a pending notice of 
intent to sue. This essay, however, employs the currently official nomenclature. 
2 Currently, the minke whale is the main species of whale commercially hunted. See 
The Mammal Society, Fact Sheet: The Minke Whale Balaenoptera acutorostrata, http://www. 
abdn.ac.uk/mammal/minke.shtml (last visited Apr. 27, 2009). The great whales are gener-
ally not commercially hunted, although Iceland and Japan hunt fin whales, and Japan has 
proposed hunting humpback whales. See Richard Black, Iceland Sets Major Whaling Quota, 
BBC News, Jan 27, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7854705.stm; Japan 
Drops Humpback Whale Hunt, BBC News, Dec. 21, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/7155255.stm. Additionally, NMFS allows Alaskan Eskimos to hunt up to seventy-five 
bowhead whales under the aboriginal subsistence exemption of the International Whaling 
Commission. Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling, 50 C.F.R. § 230.4 (2008); Aboriginal Subsis-
tence Whaling Quotas, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,035, 10,035–36 (Mar. 9, 2009).
3 See Allison H. Glass et al., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Mortality and Serious In-
jury Determinations for Baleen Whale Stocks Along the United States Eastern 
Seaboard and Adjacent Canadian Maritimes, 2002–2006, at iv, 3–5 (2008). 
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primary focus of this essay.4 Additionally, ships traversing the coastal seas 
regularly strike great whales.5 These impacts on great whales from 
coastal industrialization violate state and federal laws meant to protect 
them from these direct and collateral threats. This essay asserts that 
these killings and injuries continue—and are on the increase—because 
of a systemic failure of the prevailing paradigm of current law that man-
ages and nominally offers protection to the great whales and their 
coastal marine habitat. It is the opinion of the author that these harms 
are to a large extent preventable and that the fact that they continue 
offers an opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of the fundamental 
social and legal paradigm currently employed to protect the environ-
ment and great whales from the adverse affects of human activity.6
 The waters off the northeast coast of the United States have been 
referred to as part of the Urban Sea.7 The development impacts of the 
great coastal cities do not stop at the docks of their ports but continue 
out into the ocean. The Urban Sea reflects the commerce of the East 
Coast and the huge volume of shipping flowing through the great ports 
of New York, Philadelphia, and Boston. It is impacted by pollution and 
detritus flowing from inland and port cities and cast off by ships at sea. 
Its waters receive air pollution from inland industry and the smokestack 
emissions of ships. It is infused with noise reverberating out from ves-
sels and Navy sonar.8 The coastal sea is also laced with thousands of in-
stallations of fishing gear from fishing fleets, all of which can kill great 
whales, and some of which are never retrieved by fishermen but remain 
as derelict “ghost gear” drifting with the currents, continuing to kill 
without purpose. Conditions in the Urban Sea have deteriorated to the 
                                                                                                                      
4 See Jamison Smith et al., Nat’l Marine Fisheries Service, Large Whale Entan-
glement and Ship Strike Report 2005, at 2–4, 6 (2008), available at http://www.nero.noaa. 
gov/whaletrp/plan/disent/2005%20Large%20Whale%20Entanglement%20and%20Ship 
strike%20Report.pdf. 
5 See id. at 7; David Laist et al., Collisions Between Ships and Whales, 17 Marine Mammal 
Sci. 35, 35–36, 58–59 (2001). 
6 See James E. Scarff, The International Management of Whales, Dolphins and Porpoises: An 
Interdisciplinary Assessment (pt. 2), 6 Ecology L.Q. 571, 597–98 (1977). 
7 See generally Lee E. Koppelman et al., The Urban Sea: Long Island Sound (1976) 
(discussing the commercial development of Long Island Sound as “a microcosm of na-
tional—even global—situations”). The Urban Sea is the area of the ocean starting at the 
coastline and spanning outwards to about 100–200 miles off the coast. It is an artificial 
entity manufactured by the industrialization of the coastal seas of the United States. 
8 See Brandon Southall et al., Addressing the Effects of Human-Generated 
Sound on Marine Life: An Integrated Research Plan for U.S. Federal Agencies 13–
14 (2009); see Robin Kundis Craig, Beyond Winter v. NRDC: A Decade of Litigating the Navy’s 
Active SONAR Around the Environmental Exemptions, 36 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 353, 353–54 
(2009). 
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point that great whales can no longer survive in these urbanized coastal 
waters without active protection. 
 The great whales breed, feed, migrate, and live in the coastal wa-
ters of the Urban Sea for a majority of their life spans.9 Several coastal 
states—like Massachusetts—list them as native resident species of their 
states and protect them under state endangered species acts.10 The fed-
eral government has designated Cape Cod Bay and other coastal areas 
as essential protected habitat for the North Atlantic right whale.11 
Humpback whales breed and feed just twenty miles from downtown 
Boston on Stellwagen Bank.12 The proximity of great whale habitat to 
major metropolitan areas makes the commercial whale-watching indus-
try possible.13 It also subjects these wild animals to the adverse impacts 
of the urban environment. 
 Great whale populations in the North Atlantic are still seriously 
endangered despite the fact that they have not been hunted for dec-
ades; have few natural predators;14 and do not seem susceptible to le-
thal pandemic diseases like measles or distemper,15 although toxins 
produced from algal blooms have been linked to incidents of mass kill-
ings of great whales.16 It is the collateral destruction of individual 
whales and their marine habitat caused by the consequences of human 
commercial and industrial development that must now be seen as the 
likely cause of future whale extinctions.17 The whales are frequently 
injured and killed by human activity in the Urban Sea and these casual-
ties occur in numbers and rates that threaten the whales’ continued 
                                                                                                                      
9 Like birds need trees, the great whales require coastal habitat in the Urban Sea for 
their survival as species. 
10 321 Mass. Code Regs. 10.90 (2009) (Listing the great whales as protected species). 
11 Critical Habitat for Northern Right Whales, 50 C.F.R. § 226.203 (2008). 
12 Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary, Marine Life, http://stellwagen.noaa. 
gov/about/keyresources.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2009). 
13 See Pinnacle-travel.org, Whale Watching, http://whale-watching.pinnacle-travel.org/ 
history.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2009). 
14 See Whale Trust, Population Status: How Many Humpback Whales Are There in the 
North Pacific?, http://www.whaletrust.org/whales/whale_conservation.html (last visited 
Apr. 27, 2009). 
15 There are, however, reports that raise these concerns as well. See V.S. Hinshaw et al., 
Characterization of Two Influenza A Viruses from a Pilot Whale, 58 J. Virol. 655, 655 (1986). 
16 Joseph R. Geraci, Humpback Whales (Megaptera novaangliae) Fatally Poisoned by 
Dinoflagellate Toxin, 46 Can. J. Fisheries & Aquatic Sci. 1895, 1895–96 (1989); Diane Du-
manoski, Red Tide-Laden Mackerel Believed Cause of Humpback Whale Deaths, Boston Globe, 
Dec. 20, 1987, at 29, 42. 
17 See Richard Merrick et al., Endangered Species and Populations, in Encyclopedia of 
Marine Mammals 368, 373 (William F. Perrin et al. eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
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survival by frustrating the capacity of species populations to regain and 
maintain stable, sustainable, healthy population levels.18
 The continued killings may critically deplete their small current 
numbers and precipitate extinction of species long after commercial 
whale hunting has ended.19 Great whales possess problematic biologi-
cal parameters for survival compounded by their depleted numbers—
specifically, great whales are long-lived, slow to reproduce, and incapa-
ble of quick population recoveries.20 This is why the historical cessation 
of hunting right and humpback whales has not resulted in a rapid re-
covery of species populations.21 As this “small-population” problem 
demonstrates, so long as their numbers remain low, whales remain vul-
nerable to extinction.22
 The ruthless hunting of great whales caused the extinction of at 
least one population.23 Right whales were recognized as being so close 
to extinction that an international treaty has totally banned their hunt-
ing since 1931.24 Whaling in general became a regulated activity in 
1945 under an international treaty signed by all nations then whaling.25 
However, that treaty’s intent was essentially commercial, designed to 
prevent over-hunting to ensure that the whale-hunting industry could 
survive over time.26 American and Canadian commercial whaling died 
out primarily due to public sentiment and a lack of commercial inter-
est, not due to law or a lack of whales.27 In the early 1970s, Congress 
                                                                                                                      
18 See Hal Caswell et al., Declining Survival Probability Threatens the North Atlantic Right 
Whale, 96 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 3308, 3312–13 (1999). 
19 See Lonny Lippsett, Diving into the Right Whale Gene Pool, Oceanus, Vol. 44, No. 3, 
2005 at 18, available at http://www.whoi.edu/cms/files/kjoyce/2006/1/Oceanus-whale-
DNA_7086.pdf. Studies suggest “the low level of genetic variation in the small North Atlan-
tic right whale population” contributes to their low reproduction rate. Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 See Anthony Ronald Sinclair et al., Wildlife Ecology, Conservation, and 
Management 312 (2d ed. 2006). When wildlife populations go below a certain size they 
lose their ability to adapt to environmental stress and face an enhanced risk of extinction 
from this fact alone. See id. 
23 See James David Darling & Jim Darling, Gray Whales 24 (1999). The Atlantic 
gray whale was possibly hunted to extinction by the end of the 17th century. Id. 
24 Convention for the Regulation of Whaling art. 4, Sept. 24, 1931, 49 Stat. 3079, 155 
L.N.T.S 351. Japan did not sign on to this treaty. P. van Heijnsbergen, International 
Legal Protection of Wild Flora and Fauna 14–15 (1997). 
25 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 
161 U.N.T.S. 72.
26 Steinar Andresen, The Effectiveness of the International Whaling Commission, 46 Arctic 
108, 109 (1993). 
27 See Eric Jay Dolin, Leviathan 353–69 (2007).
436 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 36:431 
passed two relatively stringent statutes that protect whales: the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act and the Endangered Species Act.28
 That great whales are being killed in the United States and Cana-
dian Urban Sea may seem odd, because they enjoy such strong public 
support as well as full protection as endangered species under the law. 
Since the time of Moby Dick, whale conservation in the United States 
and Europe has enjoyed both political and emotional public support.29 
In part because of their massive size, they are among the most charis-
matic of wildlife, celebrity species that the public will never again allow 
to be hunted in the United States or Canada.30 Despite the charismatic 
status of great whales, the threats against them posed by the Urban Sea 
have resulted in little public outcry—in great measure because, in this 
author’s opinion, insufficient information about these threats has 
reached the public. 
 This is of interest because sympathetic public pressure is a neces-
sary factor to prompt government agencies to manage marine com-
merce in order to protect the great whales’ use of coastal marine habi-
tat. This author believes that lack of public awareness prevents criticism 
of commercial fishermen’s role in whale entanglements.31 This lack of 
public alarm facilitates commercial interests’ ability to avoid substantial 
restraints on their activities by government agencies or from private 
lawsuits. Government agencies also do not face enough political pres-
sure from non-profit groups or the scientific community to change the 
status quo. As a result, state and federal governments have little interest 
in stopping the collateral killing and injuring of great whales and tend 
to avoid significant regulation of commercial fishing designed to elimi-
nate whale entanglements.32 For example, neither federal nor state 
wildlife agencies, as a matter of policy, prosecute individuals who en-
                                                                                                                      
28 Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361–1423h (2006); Endangered Spe-
cies Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006). 
29 See, e.g., Dolin, supra note 27, at 231–32 (describing the letter from “a Polar Whale” 
in the Honolulu Friend newspaper letters section). 
30 On the other hand, even the governments of New Zealand and Australia are mili-
tant about stopping Japanese whaling. See Australia Warns Japan Over Whales, BBC News, 
May 24, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4574451.stm; Stephanie Kennedy, 
Australia Pressures IWC on Japanese Whaling, ABC News, Mar. 7, 2008, http://www.abc.net. 
au/news/stories/2008/03/07/2182722.htm. 
31 There is literature available that documents the hazards to whales but it is mostly 
found in scientific publications rather than major media outlets. See, e.g., Scott D. Kraus et 
al., North Atlantic Right Whales in Crisis, 309 Science 561, 561 (2005) (describing the effects 
of fishing gear entanglement on right whales). 
32 Outside of the North Atlantic right whales, the author is aware of no extensive ongo-
ing state or federal recovery efforts for whales. 
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tangle whales in fishing gear or strike whales with a ship.33 This state of 
affairs deserves analysis and explanation. 
 Functioning as the coal miner’s canary, the great whales in the 
North Atlantic Urban Sea warn not only of the escalating destruction of 
the coastal seas, but of the inability of the current environmental pro-
tection regime of the United States to meaningfully mitigate or prevent 
the killing—if not the extinction—of these celebrity species of wildlife. 
As a focal case in point, Part I of this essay addresses one of the major 
threats to the survival and welfare of North Atlantic great whales—the 
distressing and illuminating problem of injuries and death attributable 
to entanglement in commercial fishing gear. Part II then undertakes a 
detailed review of legal protections for great whales under United 
States statutes and regulations, and international treaties in which this 
nation participates. Part III sets out the author’s observations of delin-
quencies of omission and commission by government agencies, non-
profit organizations, and researchers, with regard to threats facing 
great whales and also offers some possible explanations. Part IV offers 
potential solutions in light of this essay’s analysis. 
I. Hazards to Great Whales: Entanglement by Commercial 
Fishing Gear in the Urban Sea 
A. Entanglement Basics: Threats Posed by Current Commercial  
Fishing Practices 
 One of the two main anthropogenic threats to great whales in the 
Urban Sea is their injurious entanglement in commercial fishing gear.34 
In large part because of the practices of its commercial fishing industry 
over the last forty years, the United States contributes significantly to 
this threat to great whales—despite theoretically stringent statutory 
protection.35
                                                                                                                      
33 See Press Release, Pub. Employees for Envtl. Responsibility, Whale Prots. Rarely En-
forced ( July 1, 2004), http://www.peer.org/news/print_detail.php?row_id=380.  
34 Kraus et al., supra note 31, at 561; Andrew J. Read, The Looming Crisis: Interactions Be-
tween Marine Mammals and Fisheries, 89 J. Mammalogy 541, 541, 543 (2008). The other 
threat is ship strikes. See Smith et al., supra note 4, at 2–3; Laist et al., supra note 5, at 35–
37. 
35 See Andrew J. Read et al., Bycatch of Marine Mammals in U.S. and Global Fisheries, 20 
Conservation Biology 163, 164 (2006). 
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 Great whales are routinely caught and entangled by commercial 
fishing gear.36 A significant number of the known anthropogenic mor-
talities and injuries of great whales in the Urban Sea come from entan-
glement in such gear.37 Great whales get caught up in ropes (lines) and 
nets used in the coastal fishing industry.38 Ropes suspended in the wa-
ter column have a surprising ability to ensnare, wrap around, and form 
cinch knots (that is, entangle) upon just about any large moving object 
that comes in contact with them.39 The actual mechanics of a whale’s 
entanglement in fishing ropes—particularly involving commercial pot 
gear and gill nets—is, in the author’s opinion, relatively simple to ap-
preciate and to prevent. The defining task in managing commercial 
fisheries so as to prevent whale entanglement is eliminating the possi-
bility of a whale making physical contact with fishing gear.40
 
Figure 1: Typical lobster pot gear deployment in U.S. coastal waters. Chart courtesy of Boston 
College Environmental Law Society, 2008. 
 
                                                                                                                      
36 See id. at 167. Ten to thirty percent of North Atlantic right whales and Gulf of Maine 
humpback whales become entangled each year. Id.; see also Amanda Johnson et al., Fishing 
Gear Involved in Entanglements of Right and Humpback Whales, 21 Marine Mammal Sci. 635, 
635–36 (2005); Kraus et al., supra note 31, at 561. 
37 See Johnson et al., supra note 36, at 636. 
38 Id. at 640–41. 
39 The lines used in the coastal fixed gear fishery are generally made of plastic poly-
mers—polypropylene, polyester and the like. See Johnson et al., supra note 36, at 638. 
40 See Read, supra note 34, at 543. 
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 Fixed fishing gear is the type of fishing equipment that causes the 
greatest number of recorded marine mammal entanglements in the 
Urban Sea.41 Fixed gear is anchored in position and tended to by fish-
erman every few days.42 Fixed gear consists of two kinds of fishing gear: 
(1) gear using traps (also called pots) tied together in a string (a trawl) 
that is attached to vertically suspended ropes (vertical buoy lines or 
VBL) from floating buoys on the sea surface; and (2) sink gill nets that 
resemble volleyball nets anchored to the sea floor (gill nets).43
 The fishery for American lobster (Homarus americanus) is the most 
familiar fishery which uses pot gear. Its rectangular box-like wire traps 
are baited and have entrance holes, but only a small exit for undersized 
crustaceans.44 Intensively deployed on the coastal ocean floor, these 
and similar forms of traps catch fish and crustaceans.45 The rope that 
runs horizontally between the adjacent linked pots in a trawl is called a 
ground-line; if buoyant, it sometimes floats in an upward curve between 
the traps.46 The ropes that extend downward from the buoys to the end 
pots in the trawls are the vertical buoy lines, and are subsequently used 
to retrieve the trawls of pots.47 The fishery for American lobsters ex-
tends along the Atlantic coast of the United States and Canada from 
the Bay of Fundy to the Carolinas. 
 The scale of the threat posed by lobster-set vertical buoy lines is 
illustrated by the placement of fixed gear at the top of Cape Cod Bay in 
relation to sightings of North Atlantic Right Whales. To enter Cape Cod 
Bay, one of their major historical habitats, right whales must pass 
through a gauntlet of vertical buoy lines anchored to thousands of lob-
ster pot trawls. Evidence suggests that great whales primarily become 
entangled in the vertical rope lines that stretch from gear on the ocean 
floor to surface-floating buoys.48 When an area becomes known as a hot 
                                                                                                                      
41 See Johnson et al., supra note 36, at 636. 
42 Each season, a typical lobster pot fisherman may deploy as many as 800 traps con-
figured as trawls, each consisting of twenty or fewer traps. There are two vertical buoy lines 
per trawl. The fishing gear remains in the water continuously for the duration of the sea-
son, which can last up to eight months or more. 
43 See Johnson et al., supra note 36, at 636–37. 
44 See Pots, FAO Fisheries Glossary, available at http://www.fao.org/fi/glossary/default. 
asp (click “Search for Term” hyperlink; then search “Pots”). 
45 See id. 
46 Johnson et al., supra note 36, at 638 & fig.1. 
47 Id. 
48 See id. at 643 (“Fifty-six percent of the entanglements for [North Atlantic right 
whales and humpback whales] involved buoy line . . . .”). The author goes on to argue, 
however, that “[w]hether buoy and surface system lines represent more of an entangle-
ment risk than groundline is currently difficult to determine.” Id. 
440 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 36:431 
spot for lobsters or prey fish, fishermen deploy thousands of traps—
with attendant buoys and vertical lines—into a limited expanse of 
coastal waters, creating a rope forest.  
 
Figure 2. Lobster trap sets and right whale sightings, Cape Cod Bay. In this chart, each dot repre-
sents a sighting of a North Atlantic right whale in Cape Cod Bay since 1988 (the solid dark area is 
the land area of Cape Cod and adjacent mainland). The lined quadrilateral zones indicate the 
locations of just three lobster pot fields where thousands of lobster gear trawls are annually de-
ployed, each set typically with one vertical buoy line attached at either end. Chart created by Jona-
than Sege, Boston College Geophysics GIS Lab, 2008. 
 
 Great whales can get entangled just from running into this gear as 
they swim along. As a whale makes physical contact with a vertical buoy 
line by running into it, the line may wrap itself around a whale’s flip-
pers, its tail, its body, and/or even through its mouth, and then set on 
itself and knot up. Repeated exposures to potentially fatal entangle-
ment are a routine event for a majority of individual great whales in the 
North Atlantic Urban Sea.49 It appears that, once entangled, some 
                                                                                                                      
49 See Read et al., supra note 35, at 167 (“50% to more than 70% of animals in some 
populations (Gulf of Maine humpbacks and North Atlantic right whales, respectively) have 
been entangled at least once in their lives . . . .”). 
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whales are able to shed the gear.50 In other entanglement episodes, ow-
ing to the whales’ large size, they can break away from some of the fish-
ing gear with only the vertical lines wrapped around them. At other 
times they carry larger amounts of fishing gear when they break away 
from an entanglement site. Severe entanglement proceeds over time to 
constrict, cut, scar, or otherwise injure them, or worse.51
 Fixed sink gill nets also entangle whales.52 Gill nets are widely used 
by the commercial fishing industry for harvesting ground fish, the spe-
cies of commercial fish that customarily live on or near the ocean 
floor—principally haddock, flounder, cod, skate, and fluke. Such nets 
also have vertical buoy lines that can entangle whales.53 Gill nets unfor-
tunately do not discriminate in what they kill. They catch and kill many 
species of fish and wildlife that are not targets of the licensed fishery— 
so-called bycatch—including seals, dolphins, turtles, and other marine 
mammals besides whales.54 Gill nets can be aptly described as a “wall of 
death.” Nets can become transient killers when they break loose and 
drift randomly around bays and oceans as derelict “ghost nets,” holding 
entrapped and decomposing sea creatures, sometimes for years, until 
the nets finally disintegrate.55
 Eyewitness accounts of entanglements are rare, despite years of 
researchers observing these whales.56 This does not mean that entan-
glement is a rare event, however. Further compelling evidence for a 
high rate of entanglement comes from reports assessing rope-scarring 
on whales, the origin of which is overwhelmingly likely to have been 
caused by entanglement in fishing gear.57 Over seventy-five percent of 
                                                                                                                      
 
50 See Johnson et al., supra note 36, at 642. 
51 See Michael J. Moore et al., Fatally Entangled Right Whales Can Die Extremely Slowly, 
(Sept. 18–21, 2006) (paper presented at OCEANS’06 MTS-IEEE Conference, Boston, MA), 
available at https://darchive.mblwhoilibrary.org/bitstream/1912/1505/1/ Moore%20et% 
20al%20IEEE%20Entanglements%202006060330-71.pdf. 
52 See Johnson et al., supra note 36, at 636. 
53 The gill net is intended to be a simple killing machine, catching any fish swimming 
through the water. When the head of a fish pushes through any of the individual openings 
in the invisible monofilament net, a nylon loop cinches around the gills behind the head. 
The caught fish is held in place with impaired gill breathing until it literally drowns. 
54 See Read, supra note 34, at 542. 
55 A ghost net can drift aimlessly for more than a dozen years before it starts to disin-
tegrate or becomes so balled-up that it can no longer kill. See, e.g., Derelict Net Entangled, 
Killed 3,500 Animals in 15 Years, SanJuanJournal.com, June 11, 2008, http://www.pnwlocal 
news.com/sanjuans/jsj/news/19785739.html. 
56 See Mason Weinrich, Behavior of a Humpback Whale (Megaptera Novaeangliae) Upon 
Entanglement in a Gill Net, 15 Marine Mammal Sci. 559, 559–61 (1999). 
57 See, e.g., Amy Knowlton et al., Analysis of Scarring on North Atlantic Right Whales 
(Eubalaena glacialis): Monitoring Rates of Entanglement Interaction: 1980–2002 11 (Feb. 
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North Atlantic right whales evidence scarring from such entanglement 
in fishing gear,58 as do approximately half of humpback whales.59 An 
assessment of the problem from field reports leaves no doubt that en-
tanglement is a routine and dangerous phenomenon. As a recent re-
port noted: “Entanglement in fishing gear is a significant cause of in-
jury and mortality to many marine mammal populations throughout 
the world. Large whale populations along the U.S. east coast remain 
susceptible to entanglement, despite management efforts to reduce 
overfishing of lobster and groundfish species.”60 Entanglement in fixed 
fishing gear inflicts significant mortality and serious injury on hump-
back whales61 and North Atlantic right whales,62 threatening the sur-
vival of these endangered species. 
 As noted above, vertical buoy lines are involved in the majority of 
recorded fixed-gear entanglements of whales.63 There are an abun-
dance of reports from the field of injured, dead, or disabled great 
whales entangled only in vertical buoy lines and attached buoys, often 
just a single line. On the other hand, the author is not aware of any 
great whale that has ever been sighted entangled solely in ground-line. 
When whales are observed dragging pots and other parts of pot gear, 
including ground-lines in these entanglements, the ground-lines are 
tied to vertical lines. Right whales in particular spend much of their 
lives swimming at or near the surface. Ground-lines hug or hover very 
near the seafloor. Great whales seldom dive to the seafloor and, when 
they do, appear to make vertical descents and ascents, not the travers-
ing lateral movement that would increase exposure to ground-line. In 
addition, the ground-lines’ lateral orientation with two ends weighted 
down by attached traps creates a geometry that tends to limit entan-
                                                                                                                      
2005) (unpublished report to the National Marine Fisheries Service) (on file with author); 
Jooke Robbins & David K. Mattila, Ctr. for Coastal Studs., Monitoring Entanglements of 
Humpback Whales (Megaptera novaeangliae) in the Gulf of Maine on the Basis of Caudal 
Peduncle Scarring (2001) (unpublished report to the 53rd Scientific Committee Meeting 
of the International Whaling Commission, Hammersmith, London), available at http:// 
www.coastalstudies.org/what-we-do/whale-rescue/scar-study.htm. Many whales are seen 
annually with fresh surface scarring caused by fishing gear entanglement. See id. 
58 Knowlton et al., supra note 57, at 11. 
59 Robbins & Mattila, supra note 57. 
60 Johnson et al., supra note 36, at 636. 
61 Id. “[A] scar-based study of Gulf of Maine humpback whale entanglement rates indi-
cated that more than half of the population had experienced a previous entanglement, 
and 8%–25% received new injuries each year.” Id. 
62 Id. “Mortality from entanglements in fishing gear, in particular fixed gear, is a factor 
inhibiting the recovery of the critically endangered North Atlantic right whale (Eubalaena 
glacialis).” Id. 
63 See id. at 640–41. 
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glement opportunity, and therefore risk. For a number of reasons 
based on physics and behavior, therefore, ground-line participation in 
entanglements thus appears to the author to be at most marginal com-
pared to the initial and continuing entanglement of whales caused by 
vertical buoy lines. When the National Marine Fisheries Service 
(NMFS) was asked via subpoena to produce any extant records of great 
whales becoming initially entangled in ground-lines rather than in ver-
tical lines, the agency responded to the court in writing that they 
“ha[d] no such records.”64
 Fishing gear, and particularly vertical buoy lines, constantly pose a 
significant risk to entangle great whales whenever the two meet in close 
encounters.65 Regulations that are reasonable—and enforced—could 
almost entirely eliminate this threat.66 Otherwise the consequences will 
be to continue to expose endangered great whales to risk of extinction 
because reproducing numbers and the gene pool are already so lim-
ited.67
 This author believes NMFS resists regulating, banning, or requir-
ing alternatives to conventional vertical buoy lines.68 As noted infra, the 
author has observed a distinct aversion to requiring re-engineering of 
vertical lines to make them “whale-safe.” Instead, NMFS chooses to is-
sue a simple mandate for sinking ground-lines as a symbolic act to ad-
dress entanglement.69 Given the questionable magnitude of the entan-
glement risk posed by ground-lines, this token regulatory act can be 
characterized as a political feint in deference to the industry that side-
                                                                                                                      
64 Subpoena issued in Strahan v. Holmes, 595 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D. Mass. 2009). When 
NMFS initially failed to comply, a contempt proceeding was brought by the plaintiff 
against it. After the court ordered its compliance, NMFS’s attorney informed the court on 
the record that NMFS had no records of ground-line ever on its own initiating the entan-
glement of a great whale. It is also possible that most ground-line found entangled on 
whales comes from gill nets, not lobster gear. 
65 Johnson et al., supra note 36, at 644. “This analysis confirms that any line rising into 
the water column poses a significant entanglement risk for these two species.” The author 
does also note, however, that groundline can also float up into the water column. Id. at 
643. 
66 See Kraus et al., supra note 31, at 562. 
67 See Lippsett, supra note 19. The results are also horribly cruel in terms of animal wel-
fare as these great mammals suffer serious injuries and long lingering painful deaths. See 
Moore et al., supra note 51. 
68 See Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations; Atlan-
tic Large Whale Take Reduction Plan Regulations, 72 Fed. Reg. 57,104, 57,104 (Oct. 5, 
2007) (covering only weak link or breakaway buoys, not vertical buoy lines) (to be codified 
at 50 C.F.R. §§ 229.2, 229.3, 635.69(a)(3), 648.264(a)(6)(i)). 
69 See id. 
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steps enforcement of the substantial commands of the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA). 
B. Alternative Technologies and Commercial Fishing Practices  
That Reduce Risk of Entanglement 
 Because feasible technology and methodology exist to substantially 
reduce—if not largely eliminate—the hazards of whale entanglement 
in vertical buoy lines, the official regulatory focus on ground-lines by 
NMFS appears to be politically driven. Effective regulation strategies 
would focus on whale-safe buoy lines and redesigning fishing seasons 
and zones to limit the time and placement of entangling gear.70 A re-
cent study comparing lobster fishing in the Canadian and American 
portions of the Gulf of Maine shows that a large reduction of fishing 
effort would greatly reduce the entanglement risk posed by the fishery 
while reducing the total lobster catch only trivially.71 This also results in 
a substantial lessening of actual net cost per pound of catch.72 The 
straightforward regulatory logic and simplicity of requiring whale-safe 
vertical lines, moreover, is obvious. Making vertical buoy lines signifi-
cantly more whale-safe does not require sophisticated electronic trap-
retrieval devices or remote-triggered buoy systems that pop up from the 
ocean floor. Stiffened, less-entangling ropes and other simple substan-
tial improvements could be readily developed.73 The failure of NMFS 
to require whale-safe ropes for commercial fishing gear is not based on 
a failure of available technology. 
                                                                                                                      
70 Kraus et al., supra note 31, at 562. 
71 See Ransom A. Myers et al., Saving Endangered Whales at No Cost, 17 Current Biol-
ogy R10, R11 (2007). “If Maine restricted its fishing season to 6 months and reduced the 
number of traps by a factor of 10, the same amount of lobster could be landed, with greatly 
reduced risk to right whales and other species.” Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Nonknottable rope designs have been developed by researchers at the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology and could be quickly brought to commercial production if a 
regulatory mandate existed to create a market. 
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II. The Current Government and Private Regulatory Paradigm 
for Protection and Conservation of Great Whales 
A. The Federal and State Regulatory Scheme for Fixed Gear Fisheries 
1. Regulation of Marine Commercial Fisheries in General 
 The marine fisheries regulatory systems adopted by both the fed-
eral government and coastal states share basic key features. State and 
local marine fisheries agencies (as opposed to inland fisheries agencies, 
which focus upon conservation and noncommercial utilization) are 
designed and established to regulate and promote the commercial ma-
rine fishing industry.74 These agencies are mandated by statute to assist 
the private commercial fishing industry, and in practice seem demon-
strably to have far less concern for serving public interests like animal 
welfare and conservation.75 The fishing agencies usually are directed by 
a commission whose membership, by explicit statutory mandate, is 
dominated by members who are either commercial fishermen or are 
otherwise associated with the commercial fishing industry. The result of 
the private commercial orientation of these agencies is that the fishing 
industry essentially regulates itself. At the federal level, moreover, state 
marine fishing agencies play a major role on the commissions govern-
ing the federal fisheries regulatory scheme and the National Marine 
Fisheries Service (NMFS).76 Environmental impact review laws have a 
tendency to limit the autonomy of these agencies as well as the fishing 
industry. In the case of state agencies, as a matter of political realities 
rather than by statutory exemption, regulation of marine fisheries is 
                                                                                                                      
74 See Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006); 
Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act 16 U. S. C. § 5101(a) (2006). 
75 See 16 U. S. C. § 1801(a)(6): “A national program for the conservation and man-
agement of the fishery resources of the United States is necessary to prevent overfishing, 
to rebuild overfished stocks, to insure conservation, to facilitate long-term protection of 
essential fish habitats, and to realize the full potential of the Nation's fishery resources.” 
These statutes show little concern for any adverse impact of fishing on the environment or 
any need to make fishing environmentally safe. 
76 Pat Murray, Coastal Conservation Association Vice President & Director of Conserva-
tion, Federal Fisheries Management 101 ( Jan./Feb. 2008), http://www.joincca.org/TIDE/ 
101.html. This “bottom up” state-federal regulation of coastal fisheries came from the need 
for state fisheries to attempt to minimize federal mandates on state fisheries. See Daniel B. 
Rodriguez, The Role of Legal Innovation in Ecosystem Management: Perspectives from American Local 
Government Law, 24 Ecology L.Q. 745, 749 (1997). 
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historically not subjected to the mandates of state environmental review 
laws.77
2. Federal Fishing Industry 
 NMFS is the federal fishing agency.78 NMFS issues regulations to 
implement fisheries management plans and has enforcement authority 
in regard to fisheries regulations. It manages marine commercial fisher-
ies principally under the terms of three federal statutes: (1) the 
Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Management Conservation Act; (2) the 
Sustainable Fisheries Act; and (3) the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Man-
agement Act. 
 The Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Management Conservation Act 
(FMCA) regulates commercial fishing off the coast of the United States 
in the Urban Sea.79 The FMCA is the core law that defines NMFS’s pur-
pose as an agency and lays out its duties.80 The FMCA regulates the tak-
ing of fish populations or stocks within the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) off the U.S. coast.81 It does this by establishing regional Fisheries 
Management Councils (FMCs) to develop Fisheries Management Plans 
(FMPs) for specific commercial fisheries.82 FMC members are required 
to be from state fishing agencies, the fishing industry, or regulated fish-
ermen.83 In 2007, Congress reauthorized the FMCA with modifica-
tions.84
                                                                                                                      
77 A case in point is the historical refusal of the Massachusetts Executive Office of En-
ergy and Environmental Affairs (EOEEA) to review the licensing of commercial fishing for 
its impact on the environment under the Massachusetts Environmental Protection Act 
(MEPA). 
78 Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1075 (1970), reprinted as amended in 5 
U.S.C. app. at 648–50 (2006), and in 84 Stat. 2090–93 (1970). NMFS was established by 
Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1970 which transferred the responsibilities of the former 
Department of Interior’s Bureau of Commercial Fisheries to it. Id. 
79 See Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 
331 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1884, 1891–1891d (2006)). 
80 NOAA Fisheries Feature: Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act Reauthorized, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/msa2007/details.html (last visited Apr. 27, 
2009). 
81 16 U.S.C. § 1811(a). “As a steward, NOAA Fisheries Service conserves, protects, and 
manages living marine resources in a way that ensures their continuation as functioning 
components of marine ecosystems, affords economic opportunities, and enhances the 
quality of life for the American public.” Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. Fisheries 
Serv., http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov (last visited Apr. 27, 2009) (emphasis added). 
82 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1851–1853. 
83 See 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b)–(c). 
84 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 
2006, Pub. L. No. 109–479, 120 Stat. 3575 (2007). 
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 In 1995 Congress passed the Sustainable Fisheries Act (SFA)85 es-
tablishing a mandate that marine fisheries be managed to ensure that 
they are sustainable and to assist in the recovery of depleted fisheries.86 
This Act is considered a part of the FMCA.87
 The Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act 
(ACFCMA)88 establishes an Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commis-
sion (ASMFC) in which each member state is represented by three 
commissioners along with a representative from NMFS.89 The Ameri-
can lobster fishery is currently managed under the terms of a voluntary 
compact of fifteen Atlantic coastal states (from Maine to Florida) or-
ganized under NMFS federal oversight pursuant to the ACFCMA.90 
Currently, NMFS has agreed to let the ASMFC and its member coastal 
states develop a uniform fisheries management plan for the American 
lobster fishery for these coastal state waters and for federal waters as 
well.91 NMFS then implements this plan under its federal management 
authority after a simple review.92 Individual states also may issue com-
plementary public laws beyond the agreed upon base regulations.93 Gill 
nets, too, are a focus of the cooperative regulatory management by 
coastal states and NMFS pursuant to the ACFCMA, along with regula-
tion of moving purse-seine techniques in modern otter trawl fishing. 
                                                                                                                      
85 Pub. L. No. 104–297, 110 Stat. 3559 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 16 
U.S.C.). See generally Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. Fisheries, Office of Sustainable 
Fisheries, Sustainable Fisheries Act, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2009) 
(providing information associated with the implementation of the Sustainable Fisheries Act).  
86 Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Implementing the Sus-
tainable Fisheries Act: Achievements from 1996 to the Present 2 (2003), available at 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/SFA-Report-FINAL7_1.pdf. 
87 See id. 
88 Pub. L. No. 103-206, 107 Stat. 2447 (1993) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 5101–5108(2006)). 
89 16 U.S.C. § 5102(3) (2006); Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. Fisheries, Office of 
Sustainable Fisheries, State-Federal Fisheries: The Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Man-
agement Act, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/state_federal/State-Federal-WEB/acfcmafs.htm 
(last visited Apr. 27, 2009). 
90 16 U.S.C. § 5101(4); Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. Fisheries, Office of Sus-
tainable Fisheries, State-Federal Fisheries: Regulatory Activities, http://www.nmfs.noaa. 
gov/sfa/state_federal/regulatory_activities.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2009). 
91 See 16 U.S.C. § 5104(a); Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management, 50 
C.F.R. pt. 697 (2008); State-Federal Fisheries: The Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative 
Management Act, supra note 89. 
92 16 U.S.C. § 5103(a); State-Federal Fisheries: The Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Coopera-
tive Management Act, supra note 89. 
93 50 C.F.R. § 697.3(c) (2008). 
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3. Coastal States Fishing Industry 
 Typical of state marine fisheries is the Massachusetts Division of 
Marine Fisheries (MDMF) that is overseen by the independent Massa-
chusetts Marine Fisheries Advisory Commission (MMFAC).94 The mem-
bers of the MMFAC are appointed by the governor and must be com-
mercial fishermen, sport fishermen, or members of the marine fisheries 
industry.95 Interestingly, Massachusetts statutes include whales within 
the definition of “fish.”96 The MMFAC is vested with the sole authority 
to approve regulations proposed by the MDMF concerning the “manner 
of taking fish” and fishing gear itself.97 This is thus a typical state ar-
rangement by which the commercial fishing industry in effect regulates 
itself. The MMFAC is usually chaired by leaders of commercial fishing 
lobby groups.98
 The failure of state fishing agencies to adequately protect the pub-
lic interest has on occasion caused various ocean user groups to seek 
protection for marine wildlife from the impact of commercial fishing. 
In 1994, Florida sports fishermen successfully promoted a measure to 
ban gill nets in Florida through a ballot referendum initiative approved 
by the voters.99 This led to a constitutional provision banning gill nets 
and other entangling nets from being used in Florida coastal waters, 
and was joined by similar bans in other states.100 The Florida law was 
challenged in court and was eventually upheld by the Florida District 
Court of Appeal for the First District.101
                                                                                                                      
94 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 130, § 1B (2006); Mass. Div. of Marine Fisheries, Marine Fisheries 
Commission, http://www.mass.gov/dfwele/dmf/marinefisheriesnotices/mfcmeetings.htm# 
marincom (last visited Apr. 27, 2009). 
95 See Mass. Div. of Marine Fisheries, supra note 94. 
96 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 130, § 1 (2006) (defining “[f]ish” as “any animal life inhabiting 
the ocean or its connecting waters including any crustacean or marine fish, whether free 
swimming or free moving, and any shellfish or sea worms, whether or not imbedded in the 
soil”). 
97 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 130, § 17A(1) (2006). 
98 The current MFAC Vice-Chairman is Bill Adler, Executive Director of the Massachu-
setts Lobstermen’s Association. See Marine Fisheries Commission, supra note 94. 
99 See Alexandra M. Renard, Will Florida’s New Net Ban Sink or Swim?: Exploring the Consti-
tutional Challenges to State Marine Fishery Restrictions, 10 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 273, 273–
75 (1995). 
100 Fla. Const. art. X, § 16(b)(1) (stating “[n]o gill nets or other entangling nets shall 
be used in any Florida waters”); Renard, supra note 99, at 275 & n.7. 
101 Fla. Marine Fisheries Comm’n v. Pringle, 736 So. 2d 17, 23–24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1999). 
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4. Effects and Causes of the Current Regulatory Framework  
 The standard regulatory provisions affecting coastal fisheries focus 
in one form or other upon catch limitations.102 Limitations of catch 
have long been criticized as so permissive that they have allowed the 
destruction of many commercial species.103 Even where excessive catch 
rates clearly threaten the reproduction of future harvestable popula-
tions, short-term pressures from the commercial industry regularly 
override scientific warnings.104
 The political forces behind commercial fishing come from a com-
bination of an appealing public image and highly focused financial and 
lobbying efforts from the large commercial players. The characteristic 
political image typically is the small family fishing boat, and the need to 
save fishing families from economic disaster and harsh government 
regulation. The substantive political force comes from, and benefit ac-
crues to, the large fishing companies that dominate the market. The 
result of the erosion of agency authority to conserve fisheries is that 
maximum sustainable yield has not been a possibility for decades.105 In 
this author’s opinion, if fishing agencies find it impracticable to enforce 
statutory mandates and adopt regulations directed at achieving maxi-
mum sustainable long-term harvests—which support the true long-term 
interests of the industry and society—it is understandable that they have 
low motivation to enforce federal and state regulatory structures for 
protecting great whales from adverse industry-caused impacts. 
B. Whale Conservation Laws: Federal and State 
 Starting with the Whaling Convention Act (WCA) of 1949, whales 
have been subject to conservation and management laws in the United 
States.106 But it is important to note that these laws generally construed 
whales to be a “living marine resource” in terms applied to harvestable 
fish, and their conservation was intended at least originally to serve the 
                                                                                                                      
102 See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 648.200–01 (2008). 
103 See Christopher Costello et al., Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries Collapse?, 321 Sci-
ence 1678, 1678 (2008). 
104 See id. 
105 Maximum sustainable yield (MSY) is a management ideal and norm that on its 
terms defines a laudable sustainability objective: maintaining the maximum level of catch 
of a fish population in a year that can then be fully replaced by simple reproduction and 
growth each year. See 50 C.F.R. § 600.310(c)(1) (2008). Under current conditions fish 
populations cannot support anything approaching MSY. 
106 See Jordan Curnutt, Animals and the Law: A SourceBook 351 (2001) (discuss-
ing the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling). 
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purpose of ensuring future supplies for commercial whale harvest-
ing.107 Even today the great whales are for all intents and purposes le-
gally lumped together with fish. As noted supra, whales are defined as 
fish by Massachusetts statute and, like fish, are protected under fisher-
ies’ living resource rules.108 The protection of great whales is thus as-
signed to fisheries agencies internally committed to supporting and 
encouraging the commercial catch, a classic problem of foxes guarding 
the chicken coop. 
1. Whaling Convention Act 
 Protection for great whales was first specifically legislated in mod-
ern times by the International Convention for the Regulation of Whal-
ing (1946), signed by all the whaling nations, establishing the Interna-
tional Whaling Commission (IWC).109 The Whaling Convention Act 
(WCA) was adopted by Congress in 1949 to implement the treaty.110 
The original motivation for the IWC was utilitarian: to preserve whales 
for future commercial harvesting: for whaling.111 The duality of in-
tent—on one hand to “protect” the whales and on the other hand to 
ensure the opportunity for commercial harvest of whales—has often 
been cited as a problematic conflict in the managed exploitation of 
natural resources.112 This purpose of management was the unabated 
practice of the IWC for the three decades following the WCA adop-
tion.113 Reflective of this, the Department of the Interior assigned man-
agement responsibilities under the WCA to the Bureau of Commercial 
Fisheries (BCF). As its name implied, the BCF was designed to encour-
age the commercial fishing industry, and did little or nothing to 
change its practices in order to meet mandates imposed on it to con-
serve threatened marine mammals. 
                                                                                                                      
107 Id. at 351–52 (discussing the International Convention for the Regulation of Whal-
ing). 
108 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 130, § 1 (2006). 
109 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 
1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72.  
110 The Whaling Convention Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-676, 64 Stat. 421 (1950) 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 916–916l (2006)). 
111 Andresen, supra note 26, at 109. 
112 Id. “The duality of purposes reflected in the 1946 Convention, conservation of the 
living resource and the ‘development’ of the industry that exploits it, resulted in a long 
history of decisions sacrificing the former objective for the attainment of the latter.” Mi-
chael J. Bean, The Evolution of National Wildlife Law 263 (1983). 
113 See Andresen, supra note 111, at 109–10. 
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 Predictably, whale populations continued to crash from over-
exploitation.114 In 1972, the United States signed on to the United Na-
tions Conference on the Human Environment (the Stockholm Declara-
tion) that called for a ten-year moratorium on hunting of great 
whales.115 The IWC voted a ten-year moratorium on whaling into effect 
in 1982 to begin in 1986.116 Japan refused to comply with the morato-
rium at first, but eventually brokered a deal with the United States to 
support the moratorium starting in 1988 in exchange for non-
enforcement of potential sanctions imposed against its other fisher-
ies.117
2. The Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969 
 The great whales were first listed as endangered species pursuant 
to the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969.118 This 1969 pre-
cursor to the ESA, however, had little or no enforceable federal protec-
tions for the species that were listed as endangered.119
3. Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1970 and the Formation of the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
 Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1970 (RPN-4) created the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).120 It also trans-
ferred all duties and staff from the BCF—including whaling manage-
ment responsibility—to the Commerce Department, which delegated it 
to NOAA.121 NMFS was created as the agency within NOAA into which 
                                                                                                                      
114 See id. 
115 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, June 5–16, 1972, Declaration of the 
U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc A/CONF.48/14 ( June 16, 1972). 
116 Curnutt, supra note 106, at 352. 
117 See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 227–28 fn.1 (1986).
118 Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, § 1(c), 83 Stat. 
275 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.) (granting to Secretary of the 
Interior the power to list endangered species); see List of Endangered Foreign Fish and 
Wildlife, 35 Fed. Reg. 18,319, 18,320 (Dec. 2, 1970) (codified as amended at 50 C.F.R. 
§ 17.11(2008)). 
119 Sections 2 and 4 provide for listing of endangered species but do not provide for 
protective measures beyond habitat conservation. See Endangered Species Conservation 
Act of 1969 §§ 2, 4. Furthermore, the Act authorized penalties in the form of fines of up to 
$5000 or imprisonment for not more than one year. See id. § 4(b). 
120 Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1970 § 2, 3 C.F.R. § 1075 (1966–1970), reprinted as 
amended in 5 U.S.C. app. at 648–50 (2006), and in 84 Stat. 2090 (1970). 
121 See id. at § 1(a), reprinted in 84 Stat. at 2090. 
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the former BCF was folded.122 The current core duty of NMFS is to 
promote, license, and regulate commercial fishing under the Fisheries 
Management and Conservation Act mandated by law to strive to obtain 
Maximum Sustainable Yields (MSY) of harvested fish.123
 There was no mandate under RPN-4 to assign management au-
thority for whales to NMFS. RPN-4 only directed that BCF duties were 
to be placed with the broad umbrella agency, NOAA, and not specifi-
cally to the fishing agency, NMFS.124 NOAA was and remains free to 
assign the responsibility for conserving and protecting great whales to 
any of its sub-agencies. This author believes responsibility for whale 
conservation could have been assigned to far better alternate agencies, 
like NOAA’s National Ocean Service. The decision to place whales with 
NMFS reflects the concept by which whales are construed as “fish” and 
“living marine resources” under federal law. Even though this transfer 
was made before the adoption of the Marine Mammal Protection Act 
(MMPA)125 and the Endangered Species Act (ESA),126 it defined the 
subsequent core status of whales under federal law as that of exploit-
able resources even under the MMPA and ESA. 
4. The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 
 The 1940s regulatory approach—justifying conservation measures 
for whales in order to enable a sustained future commercial harvest of 
whales—was similarly echoed in a subsequent major piece of statutory 
protection for whales, the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 
(MMPA).127 The MMPA declared a moratorium on the harvesting of 
marine mammals in order to build up their remaining depleted popu-
lations.128 This moratorium was to be enforced within the nation’s 200-
mile EEZ.129 The text of the MMPA expresses concerns about the 
harming of marine mammals by the commercial fishing industry, but 
its provisions are quite lenient toward fishermen and explicitly limit the 
                                                                                                                      
122 John A. Guinan & Ralph E. Curtis, Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., A 
Century of Conservation (Apr. 1971), available at http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/history/ 
stories/century.html. 
123 See id.; Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., About National Marine Fisheries Ser-
vice, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/aboutus.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2009). 
124 See Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1970, at § 1(d), reprinted in 84 Stat. at 2090. 
125 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361–1423h (2006). 
126 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006). 
127 See 16 U.S.C. § 1361. 
128 See id. § 1371. 
129 Id. § 1362(15)(B). 
2009] A New Paradigm for Conservation of Great Whales in the Urban Sea of the U.S. 453 
protection of whales from incidental takings from commercial fish-
ing.130
 The MMPA designated NOAA as its defined oversight agency, and 
NOAA assigned this responsibility to NMFS, perpetuating the con-
flicted status of whales.131 American fishermen generally do not hunt 
whales or other marine mammals, but do recognize MMPA protections 
as a serious potential limitation upon commercial fishing.132 Minimiz-
ing the MMPA’s constraints on commercial fishing appears to have en-
couraged a de facto operating policy of NMFS to treat collateral entan-
glement of great whales as a problem, but not as an object of enforced 
prohibitions under the MMPA.133
 Sections 117 and 118 of the MMPA’s 1994 amendments adopted a 
detailed regime for dealing with the problem of marine mammal en-
tanglement and entrapment by commercial fishing practices.134 They 
set as a goal that NMFS eliminate the entanglement problem by April 
2001.135 Section 117 of the MMPA requires that NMFS annually assess 
and produce a stock assessment report (SAR) on known incidents of 
killings and serious injury to specific populations of marine mammals 
from entanglement.136 Section 118 requires that NMFS publish an an-
nual list of fisheries (LOF) categorizing fisheries that cause entangle-
ments into one of three named categories based on the incidents of 
killing and serious injury (IKSI) inflicted on a marine mammal popula-
                                                                                                                      
130 See id. § 1371; see also Eugene H. Buck, CRS Report for Congress: Marine Mam-
mal Protection Act Amendments of 1994, 94-751 ENR (1994), available at http://ncse 
online.org/NLE/CRSreports/Biodiversity/biodv-11.cfm (implying that the 1994 Amend-
ments to the to the MMPA exempt commercial fishermen from the purview of the statute 
by implicitly characterizing fishing gear entanglements as incidental takings). 
131 See 16 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A)(i). 
132 See id. § 1371(a)(2) (noting that permits can be obtained for incidental takings of 
marine mammals in the course of commercial fishing); see also Philippe Sands, Princi-
ples of International Environmental Law 954 (2d ed. 2003) (highlighting the impact 
that the MMPA has on the tuna fishing industry). 
133 See 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (indicating incidental takings can be permitted under 
section 1374 of the Act). But see George A. Feldhammer et al., Wild Mammals of 
North America: Biology, Management, and Conservation 442 (2d ed. 2003) (noting 
that the NMFS is under pressure to reduce takings of whales due to ship strikes and entan-
glements and thus has proposed regulations known as recovery plans to ensure the sur-
vival and success of whales). 
134 See Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No 103-238, secs. 
10–11, 108 Stat. 532, 543–57 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1386–1387) (adding 
sections 117 and 118 to the MMPA). 
135 See 16 U.S.C. § 1387(b)(1).  
136 See id. § 1386. 
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tion by entanglements.137 This category scheme also incorporates Take 
Reduction Plans (TRP) that have the goal of reducing incidental kill-
ings and serious injuries below the potential biological removal (PBR) 
level set for the stock pursuant to Section 117.138 Fixed gear fisheries in 
the northeastern U.S. have been designated as Category I fisheries and 
thus the highest risk of IKSI to great whales.139 To assist NMFS, section 
118 allows the Secretary of Commerce, acting through a relevant office, 
to designate a Take Reduction Team (TRT) as an advisory group assist-
ing in the preparation of a TRP to specify how reduction in entangle-
ments shall be achieved.140 Emergency regulations to implement the 
TRP were to be promulgated as soon as feasible.141
 This author believes the 1994 MMPA amendments eliminated in-
centives for the commercial fishing industry to come up with ways to 
eliminate bycatch of whales on its own, instead passing the political 
burden of the bycatch problem to NMFS. In place of the lost prohibi-
tions, NMFS set out the detailed regime, described supra, aimed at re-
ducing serious entanglements to near zero by April 2001. Obviously, 
NMFS has failed to meet this mandate, as whale entanglements did not 
stop in 2001, and have at times exceeded 2001 levels.142 Unsurprisingly, 
there is a correlation between assigning sole responsibility to the NMFS 
for whale entanglements and a number of takes that exceeds the 
PBR.143
                                                                                                                      
137 See id. § 1387(d)(4); see also Authorization for Commercial Fisheries Under the Ma-
rine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 50 C.F.R. § 229.2 (2008) (defining the categories of 
fisheries under the Act).  
138 See § 1386(f); 50 C.F.R. § 229.2. The potential biological removal level is defined in 
the Code of Federal Regulations as “the maximum number of animals, not including natu-
ral mortalities, that may be removed from a marine mammal stock while allowing that 
stock to reach or maintain its optimum sustainable population.” 50 C.F.R. § 229.2. Further, 
“[t]he potential biological removal level is the product of the following factors: (1) The 
minimum population estimate of the stock; (2) One-half the maximum theoretical or es-
timated net productivity rate of the stock at a small population size; and (3) A recovery 
factor of between 0.1 and 1.0.” Id. 
139 See List of Fisheries for 2009, 73 Fed. Reg. 73,032, 73,066 (Dec. 1, 2008) (to be codi-
fied at 50 C.F.R. pt. 229). 
140 See 16 U.S.C. § 1387(f). 
141 50 C.F.R. § 229.9(a)(2). 
142 See Misty Nelson et al., Northeast Fisheries Sci. Ctr. Reference Doc. 07-05, 
Mortality and Serious Injury Determinations for Baleen Whale Stocks Along the 
United States Eastern Seaboard and Adjacent Canadian Maritimes, 2001–2005, 7 
tbl.1 (2007), available at http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/nefsc/publications/crd/crd0705/crd 
0705.pdf.
143 See Andrew J. Read & Paul R. Wade, Review: Status of Marine Mammals in the United 
States, 14 Conservation Biology 929, 931–33 (2000). 
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5. The Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen’s Protective Act of 1967 and 
the 1979 Packwood Amendment to the Fisheries Management and 
Conservation Act 
 These acts, often referred to together as “Pelly-Packwood,” imposed 
a “restriction on importation of fishery or wildlife products from coun-
tries which violate international fishery or endangered or threatened 
species programs.”144 The Supreme Court ruling in Japanese Whaling 
Association v. American Cetacean Society, however, allowed the executive 
branch broad discretion in deciding whether to trigger such trade re-
strictions, further undercutting citizen attempts to compel the imposi-
tion of authorized sanctions.145
6. The Marine Mammal Commission 
 The Marine Mammal Commission (MMC) is an independent fed-
eral commission established by statute146 to be the federal govern-
ment’s main advisor on marine mammal issues, and in the author’s 
opinion is the agency that should be assigned the federal management 
role for great whales in any future redesign of whale conservation pol-
icy. The MMC’s enabling statute requires that its commissioners must 
be persons “who are not in a position to profit from the taking of ma-
rine mammals,” recognizing the inherent compromising influence of 
vested interests in the field.147 The MMC has compiled an impressive 
record in assuming leadership for government action on the conserva-
tion of marine mammals, having recommended significant conserva-
tion actions for marine mammals, but it has been delegated no substan-
tive regulatory powers.148
7. The Endangered Species Act of 1973 
 The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) replaced and built sig-
nificantly on Congress’s original endangered species legislation.149 Two 
                                                                                                                      
144 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (2006). 
145 See 478 U.S. 221, 231–41 (1986) (noting that as long as the Secretary’s interpreta-
tion and application of the Pelly-Packwood Amendments were reasonable, they would 
receive deference from the courts). 
146 Marine Mammal Commission, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1407 (2006). 
147 See id. § 1401(b)(1). 
148 See id. § 1402(a); see also Marine Mammal Commission, Annual Reports, http://www. 
mmc.gov/reports/annual/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2009). 
149 See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Endangered Species Program, History and Evo-
lution of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (2008), http://www.fws.gov/endangered/ 
esasum.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2009). 
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improvements to the original 1966 legislation and the 1969 amend-
ments were sections 7 and 9 of the ESA.150 Section 7 of the Act provides 
that, absent an exemption from the Secretary of the Interior, all “Fed-
eral agenc[ies] shall . . . insure that any [authorized] action . . . is not 
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species 
or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modifica-
tion of habitat of such species . . . .”151 Further, section 9 of the ESA “ap-
plied broad ‘take’ prohibitions to all endangered animal species and 
allowed the prohibitions to apply to threatened animal species by special 
regulation.”152
 There are serious problems with the functionality of the improved 
ESA, however, in that it does not effectively establish an agency to over-
see implementation of section 7 reviews, to enforce section 9 prohibi-
tions, and otherwise oversee compliance by other government agencies 
with mandatory and nondiscretionary ESA duties. These statutory 
functions are largely left to the vagaries of citizen enforcement.153
 Section 9 also suffers from not including an explicitly stated pro-
hibition against individuals conducting “activities” that take endan-
gered wildlife, as well as on such activities themselves.154 Based on the 
wording of the ESA text and existing case law, section 9 prohibitions 
clearly apply when a person engages in an activity that actually causes a 
prohibited taking.155 Unfortunately, section 9 does not prohibit a fish-
erman’s actual deployment of types of fishing gear known to entangle 
whales (for example, fixed gear) in the absence of a specific entangle-
ment.156 The current need under section 9 jurisprudence to prove that 
each person out of thousands doing the same thing will “actually” on 
his own kill an animal—whether it be a lumberman cutting trees where 
endangered birds live or a fisherman using vertical buoy lines in Cape 
Cod Bay—in order to enforce section 9 prohibitions against him per-
sonally is enough to block the effective injunctive protection of great 
whales at the present time.157
                                                                                                                      
150 See id. 
151 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006).
152 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, supra note 149; see 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a), (g). 
153 See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g).
154 See id. § 1538. 
155 See id. 
156 See id.; see also Am. Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163, 165–67 (1st Cir. 1993) (indicat-
ing that takings must be intentional or cause actual harm); 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2007) (defin-
ing the term “taking” in the context of the ESA). 
157 See 16 U.S.C. § 1538; Am. Bald Eagle, 9 F.3d at 163; 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. 
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8. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships: MARPOL 73/78. 
 The MARPOL Convention was incorporated into U.S. law by the 
federal Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS).158 The statute de-
fined derelict fishing gear as “pollution” and bans it.159
9. State Conservation Programs for Whales 
 Currently, there is a lack of cooperation between states and the 
federal government regarding endangered species and state participa-
tion generally.160 Some states have adopted their own endangered spe-
cies acts.161 However, such state laws can be preempted by the federal 
ESA if they are determined to be more lax than the federal law.162 
States, like the federal government, often divide wildlife agencies into 
land-based and marine-based agencies. State marine fisheries agencies 
historically focused only on commercial fishing, disregarding protec-
tions for whales, marine mammals, and sea birds as a job for the land-
based wildlife state agencies assigned the role of protecting all state 
wildlife as protected species. However—perhaps because entangle-
ments of endangered marine mammals now are recognized as posing 
an increasing potential for limitations upon commercial fishing—there 
is a current move for state marine fishing agencies to take over endan-
gered species jurisdiction as applied to endangered marine wildlife, 
contradicting the terms of relevant state statutes.163  
                                                                                                                      
 
158 Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1915 (2006); see also Bruce 
S. Manheim, Annex V of the MARPOL Convention: Will It Stop Marine Plastic Pollution?, 1 Geo. 
Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 71, 72 (1988). 
159 See Comm. on the Effectiveness of Int’l and Nat’l Measures to Prevent and 
Reduce Marine Debris and Its Impacts, Nat’l Research Council of the Nat’l 
Acads., Tackling Marine Debris in the 21st Century 90 (2008). 
160 See Robert L. Fischman & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for Conservation from Pollution 
Control Law: Cooperative Federalism for Recovery Under the Endangered Species Act, 27 Colum. J. 
Envtl. L. 45, 78–81 (2002); James M. Taylor, Governors Call for Endangered Species Act Reform, 
Env’t & Climate News, May 1, 2004, http://www.heartland.org/policybot/results/14867/ 
Governors_Call_for_Endangered_Species_Act_Reform.html. 
161 See, e.g., The Massachusetts Endangered Species Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 131A 
(2006). 
162 See Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 160, at 80. 
163 In 1993 the MDMF forced the Massachusetts Division of Fish and Wildlife, the 
proper endangered species agency, to sign a memorandum of understanding ceding man-
agement and lead agency responsibility for whales in state waters to it. The MDFW and its 
Natural Heritage and Endangered Species Program (NHESP) are imbued by the Massa-
chusetts Endangered Species Act (MESA) with responsibility for all state protected endan-
gered species—including whales. Because of the 1993 MOU, great whales in Massachusetts 
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C. The Entanglement Problem—Regulatory Efforts by Fishing Agencies 
 Prior to the 1994 amendments to the MMPA, NMFS and state ma-
rine fishing agencies largely ignored the problem of the entanglement 
of great whales in fishing gear. To a substantial extent, NMFS also 
tended to ignore the ESA in regards to endangered great whales until 
lawsuits coerced it to do otherwise.164 At present, there is no currently 
active NMFS-appointed ESA recovery team for any endangered spe-
cies—including the great whale species—and no significantly funded 
recovery program, except for the North Atlantic right whale recovery 
program. NMFS prefers to address protection for great whales under 
the more lenient terms of the MMPA, which treats marine mammals as 
a “living resource” to be managed like fish stocks, is industry-tolerant, 
does not directly prohibit entanglement of great whales, and does not 
allow citizen enforcement of its rules.165  
1. Federal Regulation of Fisheries to Reduce Entanglement 
 Federal and state regulatory attention to the great whale entan-
glement problem of can be attributed to two linked elements: (1) the 
passage of the 1994 amendments to the MMPA, which at least adverted 
to the problem; and (2) the commencement of two citizen lawsuits: 
one against the United States Coast Guard and NMFS—Strahan v. 
Linnon166—and the other against the Massachusetts Division of Marine 
Fisheries (MDMF)—Strahan v. Coxe.167 The lawsuits were precipitated 
by the failure of NMFS to take appropriate actions to assemble the re-
quired MMPA Take Reduction Team (TRT) for the great whales or 
                                                                                                                      
coastal waters were effectively removed from any protection by MESA. The author is aware 
of no provision of the MESA or law that supports the 1993 MOU. It remains in effect to 
the present day. 
164 The list of private action ESA and MMPA enforcement cases for whales is large. See, 
e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 532 F.3d 913 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc. v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2008); Vill. of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 
605 (9th Cir. 1984); Ocean Mammal Inst. v. Gates, 546 F. Supp. 2d 960 (D. Haw. 2008); 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Evans, 232 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
165 Unlike most environmental statutes, the MMPA does not include a citizen standing 
enforcement provision. 16 U.S.C. § 1377 (stating “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this 
subchapter, the Secretary shall enforce the provisions of this subchapter”); Strahan v. 
Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 160 (1st Cir. 1997). 
166 967 F. Supp. 581 (D. Mass. 1997); see also Amber Shell Ward, Casenote, Strahan v. 
Linnon: A Missed Opportunity for Testing the Use of Section 7(a)(1) as an Action-Forcing Provision, 
4 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 311 (1999). 
167 Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 160 (1st Cir. 1997); see also Susan Gray, Recent De-
velopment, Strahan v. Coxe: Massachusetts’s Issuance of Commercial Fishing Permits Constitutes 
a Violation of the Endangered Species Act, 6 U. Balt. J. Envtl. L. 260 (1997–1998). 
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make the necessary formal List of Fisheries (LOF) determinations re-
quired by the MMPA’s 1994 amendments. 
 Linnon addressed incidents of Coast Guard boats killing and injur-
ing right whales,168 and prompted NMFS to establish a Large Whale 
TRT.169 The suit also prompted NMFS to agree to classify inshore and 
offshore lobster fisheries as Category I in its first published LOF.170 The 
Linnon suit also led NMFS to adopt of a rule requiring a 500-yard dis-
tance separation between whales and boats.171
 In 1999, NMFS adopted its first version of its Atlantic Large Whale 
Take Reduction Plan (ALWTRP) for the great whales in the United 
States Urban Sea of the North Atlantic.172 The 1999 ALWTRP stated its 
long-term goal was to reduce entanglement-related injuries and mor-
talities to right, fin, humpback, sei, and minke whales.173 However, in 
practice, NMFS focused its efforts almost exclusively on the right whale, 
in effect creating, in this author’s opinion, a non-statutory requirement 
that a species be facing imminent extinction in order to be the benefi-
ciary of any government efforts to stop their killing in fishing gear or by 
ship strikes.174
 Further entanglements after the publication of the 1999 ALWTRP 
prompted NMFS to mandate gear modifications, such as the use of 
weak-link buoy lines, as well as seasonal area restrictions.175 These 
measures subsequently proved to be ineffective.176 This author main-
tains that the required break-away link technology had never been 
tested in the field and the required seasonal area restrictions also of-
fered no proven track record for anyone to expect it to work. Other 
vertical buoy line mitigation proposals calling for electronically re-
                                                                                                                      
168 967 F. Supp. at 589. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id.; North Atlantic Right Whale Protection, 62 Fed. Reg. 6729 (Feb. 13, 1997) 
(codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 217, 222). 
172 See Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations; At-
lantic Large Whale Take Reduction Plan Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 7529 (Feb. 16, 1999) 
(codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 229). 
173 Id. at 7531. 
174 For example, the 1999 ALWTRP only requires gear marking of lobster and gillnet 
gear in “right whale critical habitat, in the southeast observer area and on Stellwagen Bank 
and Jeffreys Ledge in the Gulf of Maine.” Id. at 7533. 
175 Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduction Plan Regulations, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,368, 
80,368, 80,374–75 (Dec. 21, 2001) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 229). 
176 The entanglement of a right whale in July 2001 in gear with the “weak link” modifi-
cations spurred NMFS to propose further alterations. Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduc-
tion Plan Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,896, 49,899 (Oct. 1, 2001). 
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leased buoy assemblies on the sea floor have yet to go beyond the wish-
ful-thinking phase.177
 In its 2007 amendment to its ALWTRP,178 NMFS did not explore 
other practical alternative approaches to resolving the vertical buoy line 
threat—stiffened vertical lines that cannot entangle, or substantial re-
duction in numbers or locations of deployment of fishing gear sets that 
would mitigate the threat.179 Instead, NMFS adopted a more lenient 
Massachusetts-type approach, directing that licensed fisheries use sink-
ing ground-line as the sole means to reduce entanglement risk.180 NMFS 
also abandoned a useful previous requirement—the Dynamic Area 
Management (DAM) and Seasonal Area Management (SAM) policies181 
that limited placement of fixed gear near some of the places where right 
whales are known to aggregate. The sole justification for the 2007 
ALWTRP sinking ground-line requirement, beyond its simplicity of 
adoption, was a theory devoid of empirical evidence for its support— 
that nonsinking ground-line is the most significant source of right whale 
entanglement. NMFS asserted, despite a lack of evidence, that requiring 
widespread use of sinking ground-line would substantially reduce the 
threat to Right Whales of entanglement by lobster pot gear sufficiently 
to comply with the MMPA and ESA. The 2007 ALWTRP stated it would 
                                                                                                                      
177 Pop-up buoys are not commercially available and exist only as unproven experi-
mental technology. 
178 Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduction Plan Regulations, 72 Fed. Reg. 57,104, 57,105–
06 (Oct. 5, 2007) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 229, 635, 648). The 2007 amendment to the 
ALWTRP was advanced because of the continuing killing and injuring of right whales under 
the regime of the 2005 ALWTRP in Fixed Gear. See id. at 57,104. 
179 See id. at 57,106 (only requiring weak links on buoy lines). 
180 See id. 
181 Id. at 57,105–06. Dynamic Area Management (DAM) is a management strategy to 
declare an emergency zone around a recent aggregation of right whales and to impose for 
a stated temporary period of time in the declared DAM area further restrictions on fixed 
fishing gear. Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduction Plan Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 1133, 
1134–35 ( Jan. 9, 2002). See generally Phillip J. Clapham & Richard M. Pace, Northeast 
Fisheries Sci. Ctr. Reference Doc. 01-06, Defining Triggers for Temporary Area 
Closures to Protect Right Whales from Entanglements: Issues and Options 
(2001) (discussing triggers for DAM). Seasonal Area Management (SAM) is a management 
strategy to declare a seasonal zone around areas where aggregation of right whales are 
seasonally expected, and to impose for a stated period of time each year further restric-
tions on fixed fishing gear in the SAM area. Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduction Plan 
Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 1142, 1150 ( Jan. 9, 2002); see Richard L. Merrick et al., 
Northeast Fisheries Sci. Ctr. Reference Doc. 01-14, Identification of Seasonal 
Area Management Zones for North Atlantic Right Whale Conservation, at v 
(2001). 
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postpone consideration of the proven threat posed by vertical buoy lines 
to an indefinite “future date.”182
 NMFS’s current de facto policy of refusing to enforce ESA section 
9 prohibitions to prevent entanglements of great whales practically dis-
courages the innovation and adoption of whale-safe fishing technology. 
NMFS has also chosen to oppose private enforcement actions against 
the industry and to assist fishermen in winning these lawsuits.183 De-
spite the large number of incidents where whales have been injured or 
killed by vertical buoy lines and the fact that in many entanglement 
events the removed gear had tags on it identifying the owner, NMFS has 
never prosecuted a fisherman for an entanglement of a great whale 
under the ESA or MMPA. In 1997, the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
held in Strahan v. Coxe that entanglements are prohibited ESA tak-
ings.184 In response, however, NMFS adopted a policy not to enforce 
the section 9 take prohibitions, instead treating whale entanglement as 
a regulatory problem to be handled under the agency’s commercial 
fishing regulatory program. In so doing, NMFS’s refusal to prosecute 
any fisherman whose fishing gear entangles endangered whales applies 
even when fishermen explicitly acknowledge that their gear entangled 
a specific whale.185 The author concludes that by its avoidance of prose-
                                                                                                                      
 
182 Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduction Plan Regulations, 72 Fed. Reg. 57,104, 57,117 
(Oct. 5, 2007) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 229, 635, 648) (“[T]he DEIS includes a dis-
cussion of vertical lines. Specifically, the DEIS notes that further risk reduction to address 
risk associated with vertical line will occur through a future rulemaking action due to the 
need for additional information and discussions to develop comprehensive and effective 
management measures.”). 
183 NMFS refused to comply with—and sought to quash—all subpoenas that the au-
thor served on it to reveal the names of commercial fishermen whose fishing gear entan-
gled a great whale. The Center for Coastal Studies—who is contracted to perform great 
whale disentanglement—also refuses to reveal the identity of the fishermen who own the 
fishing gear that it removes from entangled great whales. 
184 See Strahan v. Coxe, 939 F. Supp. 963, 984 (D. Mass. 1996); see also Strahan v. 
Holmes, No. 07-10359-NMG, slip op. at 7 (D. Mass. filed Jan. 30, 2009). 
Although the whale . . . was later disentangled from the gear stuck in its ba-
leen, it was “taken captive” by Holmes’s gear for at least some period of 
time. . . . Therefore, the Court concludes that Holmes violated Section 9 of 
the ESA when the humpback whale became entangled, and hence “taken,” in 
his lobster gear. The fact that the taking was accidental is irrelevant. 
Id. See also Greenpeace Found. v. Mineta, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1136 (D. Haw. 2000) (find-
ing accidental takes of monk seals to be takes, nonetheless). 
185 For example, attorney Deirdre Casey from the civil enforcement section of NOAA’s 
Office of General Counsel for Enforcement and Litigation (GCEL) in Gloucester, MA 
stated in 2008 that fishermen should not be prosecuted for entangling whales because they 
are under license by NMFS and a whale entanglement is incidental to NMFS’s licensing 
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cutions, NMFS has simply chosen to ignore the ESA statutory prohibi-
tions and its statutory responsibilities to enforce them. 
 NMFS has a specialized ESA office distinct from its MMPA of-
fice.186 NMFS, however, removed great whales from the jurisdiction of 
its internal ESA enforcement division and placed them exclusively un-
der the jurisdiction of the office vested with the more lenient require-
ments of the MMPA, which refuses to prosecute fisherman under ESA 
section 9 for entangling great whales, or to require ESA compliance by 
state licensing agencies. The court in Coxe required Massachusetts to 
apply to NMFS for an incidental take permit (ITP) for the right 
whale.187 NMFS, however, has refused to process the resultant applica-
tion and has yet to ask any state marine fishing agency to apply for an 
ITP for whales under section 10 of the ESA to manage fisheries in 
compliance with section 9’s take prohibitions. 
 A recent example of such agency avoidance is NMFS’s refusal to 
prosecute a fisherman who admitted to NMFS employees that he 
owned and had placed the fishing gear removed from an entangled 
humpback whale in August, 2006.188 The removed gear had his name 
and permit number on it. NMFS investigators declined, however, to 
refer the fisherman and the entanglement incident to its civil or crimi-
nal enforcement offices for consideration of possible prosecution and 
                                                                                                                      
and regulating of their fishing. Telephone Interview with Deirdre Casey, Attorney in Office 
of General Counsel for Enforcement and Litigation, NOAA (Dec. 8, 2008). 
186 See Office of Protected Fisheries, National Marine Fisheries Service, About the Of-
fice of Protected Fisheries, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/about (last visited Apr. 27, 
2009). Sea turtles, for example, are handled by its ESA office, which has actively applied 
section 9 against a state fishery agency regarding turtle entanglement in state-licensed 
fishing gear. NMFS has issued an ESA section 10 incidental take permit—NMFS ITP 
#1325—to the state of North Carolina Division of Marine Fisheries for the entanglement 
of endangered species of sea turtles in the fishing trawls it licenses and regulates. See Issu-
ance of Permits #1325 and 1348, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,023 (Oct. 5, 2001). As this article was 
going to press, the office of the U.S. Attorney in Boston brought criminal indictments for 
violating the MMPA against commercial gillnetters for entangling humpback whales in two 
separate incidents. See Complaint at 4–6, United States v. Eldridge, No. 09-10059 (D. Mass., 
Mar. 9, 2009); Complaint at 3–5, United States v. Jacques, No. 09-10066 (D. Mass., Mar. 11, 
2009). These are the first such governmental prosecutions of fishermen under either the 
ESA or the MMPA in the Northeast, and may be unprecedented nationally as well. 
187 See Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 158 (1st Cir. 1997). 
188 The author is the citizen advocate bringing the suit in question. See Strahan v. 
Holmes, 595 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D. Mass. 2009). On August 2, 2006, the entangled humpback 
whale was sighted in Cape Cod Bay off the Massachusetts coast. A disentanglement effort 
was commenced by an NGO—the Center for Coastal Studies—contracted by NMFS and 
the state fishing agency to do this work. Vertical buoy line and a single attached lobster pot 
were removed from the whale. Id. at 162–63. 
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assessment of a civil fine.189 NMFS also attempted to keep the name of 
the fisherman secret, which would effectively prevent citizen enforce-
ment under the ESA citizen suit provision. When NMFS was subpoe-
naed to produce the records of this entanglement,190 it refused to pro-
duce any document with the name or permit number of the fisherman 
on it. On photographs of the entangling fishing gear supplied pursuant 
to subpoena, NMFS redacted the permit number to prevent identifica-
tion. Eventually, a federal judge ordered NMFS under threat of con-
tempt to supply nonredacted photos and the missing documents, and 
the withheld information was released.191 While this entanglement was 
the subject of an ESA citizen enforcement suit, the federal court ac-
knowledged that the entanglement violated the law, but refused to issue 
an order to prevent future such entanglements of whales.192
 NMFS has also failed to initiate any specific program to eliminate 
the risk of whale entanglements. Over the years, NMFS has undertaken 
only limited efforts to assess or encourage scientific development of 
nonentangling fishing gear, and funding has generally been awarded to 
research unlikely to lead to substantial changes in established industry 
practices. NMFS has in practice declined to impose restraints upon 
commercial fishing to meet the MMPA’s 1994 amendments’ 2001 goal 
of zero risk of death or serious injury to great whales from fishing gear. 
It has declined to state when it may actually issue a zero-risk standard. 
 Great whale entanglement is in effect treated by NMFS as a prob-
lem of bycatch—the incidental catch of under-sized fish or species of 
fish neither intended nor licensed to be caught.193 NMFS applies its 
                                                                                                                      
189 Complaint at 22, Strahan v. Holmes, 595 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D. Mass. 2009) (No. 
07-cv-10359-NMG). 
190 The subpoena was issued pursuant to an ongoing ESA enforcement action in the 
U.S. District Court in Boston, MA against the Massachusetts state marine fishing agency. See 
Strahan v. Pritchard, 473 F. Supp. 2d 230, 237 (D. Mass. 2007). 
191 The fisherman subsequently maintained that the fishing gear was not placed within 
the 3-mile boundary of Massachusetts’s state jurisdiction, despite the disentanglement 
occurring within its jurisdictional boundary. See id. The “not in state waters” claim was then 
used by the court to find that the August 2006 entanglement could not be used by the 
plaintiff to prove that Massachusetts’s licensing of lobster pot fishing causes whale entan-
glements in violation of the ESA. See id. at 237–38. 
192 Strahan v. Holmes, No. 07-10359-NMG, slip op. at 8–10 (D. Mass. filed Jan. 30, 
2009).
193 See NOAA Fisheries Feature: What is Bycatch?, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/by_ 
catch/bycatch_whatis.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2009). There are significant efforts under-
way to reduce bycatch of all types. See id. 
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bycatch policy—in general, a “sustainable” bycatch is tolerated194—to 
great whales as it would to fish.195
 The federal courts for their part have held that NMFS’s FMCA 
regulations cannot be directly challenged under the Administrative 
Procedure Act for violations of MMPA and ESA mandatory duties, only 
under the citizen suit provision of the FMCA. Violations of MMPA and 
ESA duties thus at best result in collateral review. Federal courts to date 
will not enjoin federal fisheries regulations for failure to comply with 
the MMPA or ESA.196
 NMFS has no internal research and engineering program to de-
velop whale-safe fishing gear. It has funded several research projects by 
grants from the National Fish and Wildlife Fund, but this money has 
primarily gone to amateur inventors for attenuated ideas.197 Grant 
money is directed to proposals recommended for approval by commer-
cial fishermen.198 The MDMF Right Whale Conservation Program is 
funded by NMFS through the ESA section 6 cooperative agreement 
program with state governments.199 NMFS does not engage in formal 
and directed engineering initiatives to produce whale-safe fishing gear. 
It does not fund dedicated university or corporate engineering projects 
to make fishing gear whale-safe. Absent enforcement of ESA section 9 
prohibitions against fishermen whose gear entangles great whales, and 
absent significant state or federal funding of engineering solutions to 
                                                                                                                      
194 See Sustainable Fisheries Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1802(5), 1851(a)(9) (2006). 
195 See 16 U.S.C. § 1387 (2006) (outlining the bycatch policy as it pertains to marine 
mammals); 16 U.S.C. § 1802(2) (defining “bycatch” to pertain to “fish”); 16 U.S.C. § 1802(12) 
(defining “fish” to be “all . . . forms of marine animal and plant life other than marine mam-
mals”). 
196 See, e.g., Turtle Island Restoration Network v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 438 F.3d 
937, 946 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Blue Water Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries 
Serv., 158 F. Supp. 2d 118, 121–22 (D. Mass. 2001)). “[T]he NMFS implemented the rule 
pursuant to its authority over FMPs under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, not the Endangered 
Species Act. . . . [C]ouching the action in different statutory language ‘is not a hook which 
can remove the prohibitions of the Magnuson-Stevens Act.’” Blue Water Fishermen’s Ass’n, 
158 F. Supp. 2d at 122 (quoting A.M.L. Int’l, Inc., v. Daley, No. 00-10241-EFH (D. Mass. 
May 18, 2000)). This means that ESA section 7 claims against fisheries management under 
the FMCA must be brought pursuant to the FMCA citizen-suit provision. 
197 See Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Strategic Plan for Fisheries Research 41 
(1998) (stating that most of the “recent gear research . . . has been accomplished through 
grants . . . [that] have gone to fishers, or to organizations such as states and universities, 
which carry out the research with the help and cooperation of the fishing industry”). 
198 See id. 
199 See 16 U.S.C. § 1535(d) (2006); Mass. Div. of Marine Fisheries, Budgets, http://www. 
mass.gov/dfwele/dmf/information/budgets.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2009). The funds from 
Congress are funneled directly through the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation—an en-
tity established by Congress to distribute funds for wildlife management. 
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whale entanglement by fishing gear, there is, at best, limited private en-
trepreneurial motivation to develop whale-safe technology. 
 In 2007, the Marine Mammal Commission (MMC) sponsored a 
review of NMFS’s program to reduce the risk of entanglement of great 
whales in fixed gear.200 The study was highly critical of NMFS’s meth-
ods, and doubted their ability to reduce risk for whale entanglement. 
The report stated: 
Complicating efforts to resolve the entanglement issue is the 
fact that NMFS has a dual charge—on one hand to promote 
and manage fisheries and on the other to protect right whales 
and encourage their recovery. These often-conflicting man-
dates are administered by separate programs within the 
agency. The role of the federal regional fishery management 
councils and the various state fishery management agencies in 
developing management plans complicates matters further. To 
overcome these complications, the entanglement problem 
needs to be recognized as a fishery management crisis that re-
quires decisive action at the highest levels of government. The 
extinction of the North Atlantic right whales would represent a 
fundamental failure in both fishery management and the con-
servation of protected resources in the United States.201
 In 2007, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) did a study on 
NMFS’s proposed 2007 ALWTRP and found it critically lacking in offer-
ing any reasonable expectation of possible success.202 Further, “its sci-
entific stock assessments and entanglement reports . . . showed that—
despite current regulatory measures—right and humpback whales are 
being seriously injured or killed by entanglements in commercial fish-
ing gear at a rate that limits the species’ ability to recover.”203
                                                                                                                      
200 Randall R. Reeves et al., Report of the North Atlantic Right Whale Pro-
gram Review 3 (2007), available at http://www.mmc.gov/reports/workshop/pdf/rightwhale 
report.pdf. 
201 Id. at 41. 
202 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, National Marine Fisheries Service: Im-
proved Economic Analysis and Evaluation Strategies Needed for Proposed Changes 
to Atlantic Large Whale Protection Plan 7–8 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d07881.pdf. The report stated that “NMFS has not developed strategies for fully 
evaluating the effectiveness of the proposed regulatory changes,” and that “NMFS has not yet 
developed a strategy for monitoring the level of industry compliance.” Id. 
203 Id. at 5. The report also found that “NMFS developed the specific proposed gear 
modifications [i.e., ground-line rules] based, in part, on a study of gear found on entan-
gled right and humpback whales that indicated that all parts of commercial fishing gear 
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2. State Regulation of Fisheries to Reduce Entanglement 
 In 1998 the Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries (MDMF) 
was forced to take measures to reduce the risk of right whale entangle-
ment in state-licensed fishing gear as a result of an order issued in the 
Strahan v. Coxe decision. The court found that state fishing regulatory 
agencies—in that case the MDMF—are liable for violating the ESA sec-
tion 9 take prohibitions as a result of great whales being entangled in 
the fishing gear they license and regulate. The court held that any en-
tanglement is a violation of the ESA section 9 prohibitions.204 The Coxe 
decision resulted in an order for the MDMF to form a “working group” 
to come up with a plan to reduce the risk of entanglement in licensed 
fishing gear. In order to “get out from under the order,”205 the agency 
decided to impose entanglement prevention measures, and in so doing 
established a right whale conservation program (MDMF Right Whale 
Program) that continues to the present day.206 The MDMF added on to 
its codified regulations a section that is dedicated to right whale con-
servation—titled “Northern Right Whales”207—containing special rules 
to reduce the risk of entanglement of right whales in the fishing gear it 
licensed.208 The MDMF also has produced an annual report on the ac-
tivities of its MDMF Right Whale Program.209
 The MDMF Right Whale Program in practice, however, has not 
operated to make state-licensed fishing gear whale-safe. It has adopted 
no requirement that fishing gear be whale-safe. Its whale conservation 
program is centered upon an agreement executed with a fishing indus-
                                                                                                                      
create a risk of entanglement for these whales,” implying that other portions of the gear, 
like vertical lines, should have been regulated. See Id. (emphasis added). 
204 See Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 168 (1st Cir. 1997). 
205 Interview with David Hoover, Legal Counsel, Massachusetts Division of Marine 
Fisheries, in Boston, Mass. (Apr. 1999). 
206 See Erin Burke & Dan McKiernan, Mass. Div. of Marine Fisheries, Right Whale 
Conservation, www.mass.gov/dfwele/dmf/programsandprojects/ritwhale.htm (last visited 
Apr. 27, 2009). “MarineFisheries Conservation Program was established in 1997 with input 
from the Massachusetts Endangered Whale Working Group. The Working Group was 
appointed by the federal court and charged with devising measures to minimize harm to 
Northern Right Whales in state waters.” Id. 
207 322 Mass. Code Regs. §§ 12.00–.11 (2006). 
208 See id. § 12.01. 
209 Erin Burke & Dan McKiernan, Div. of Marine Fisheries, Massachusetts 
Division of Marine Fisheries Right Whale Conservation Program: 2005 Projects 
and Accomplishments (2005). Because the Strahan v. Coxe injunction only required ac-
tions to benefit the right whale and no other great whale species, the state agency, like 
NMFS, targeted its rules to reduce entanglement risks for right whales alone, without di-
rect regard for the migration patterns and locations of other species of great whale. See 322 
Mass. Code Regs. §§ 12.01–.11; Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 158 (1st Cir. 1997). 
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try association and an NGO intervening in the Strahan v. Coxe law-
suit,210 calling for use of sinking ground lines with no meaningful re-
straints on vertical buoy lines, and funding for another NGO to seek 
out entangled right whales and attempt disentanglement.211 In prac-
tice, the MDMF Right Whale Program serves to shield the agency from 
being subjected to further court orders requiring it to actually end the 
entanglement of whales in state-licensed fishing gear. 
 Since no other state has been subjected to a lawsuit, no Atlantic 
coastal state other than Massachusetts has initiated its own state-based 
conservation effort for great whales to reduce the risk of entanglement. 
The initiative for whale conservation is deemed primarily to be a fed-
eral problem—a “top down” government problem. By contrast, marine 
fisheries regulation is deemed a “bottom up” regulatory scheme where 
states have the major role in coastal fisheries—in direct terms by licens-
ing fishing in state waters, and on the federal level by state dominance 
of federal regional fisheries management councils. Since the fishing 
industry has dominating influence in the state fishing agencies, it effec-
tively controls NMFS. To close this circle, it can be observed that some 
of the most progressive politicians in coastal states are ironically among 
the most ardent supporters of the fishing industry’s “self-regulation.”212 
Coupled with consistent support in Congress,213 the industry has been 
aided by state fisheries agencies in resisting efforts to force fisheries to 
comply with ESA prohibitions on whale entanglement and state envi-
ronmental review laws. 
                                                                                                                      
210 The Massachusetts Lobstermen’s Association (MLA) and the Conservation Law 
Foundation (CLF) brokered the deal with the state. See Strahan v. Coxe, 939 F. Supp. 963, 
963 (D. Mass. 1996) (showing that CLF did intervene in the suit). 
211 Currently the MDMF gives funding to the Provincetown Center for Coastal Studies 
to look for right whales—especially entangled ones. Provincetown Center for Coastal 
Studies, Annual Report 2007: A Year in Review 7, 11 (2008), available at http://www. 
coastalstudies.org/pdf/AnnRep07_2.pdf (stating that the group disentangles large whales 
and identifying the Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries as a donor). 
212 Richard Gaines, Senators’ Moves to Right Fishing Rule in Limbo, Gloucester Daily 
Times Online (Mass.), Mar. 18, 2009, http://www.gloucestertimes.com/punews/local_ 
story_077221439.html?keyword=topstory (describing northeastern Senators’ united front 
against a specific federal fishing regulation). 
213 In Massachusetts, Senators Kennedy and Kerry consistently support the fishing in-
dustry’s self-regulation, as do Senators Collins and Snowe in Maine. Like the late Repre-
sentative Gerry Studds, federal legislators who are otherwise among the most progressive 
have regularly championed the commercial fishing industry’s interests. See id. 
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III. The Green Knight Has Left the Building:  
Failure of the Current Societal Paradigm  
for Protection of Great Whales 
 Over the past century, our national policies and strategies for envi-
ronmental protection have been fundamentally based on the ideas and 
efforts of individual altruistic citizens who organized others in citizen-
based political movements for environmental protection.214 These are 
the “Green Knights” whose efforts are almost wholly responsible for cur-
rent state and federal regulatory schemes for protecting environmental 
quality for the general benefit of the public. First with the late 19th cen-
tury “conservation” movement and then the later 1970s “environ-
mental” movements, more than two dozen federal statutes were drafted 
and regulatory systems designed and pushed by these private entities— 
not by legislatures, business, or by the normal established players in our 
system of government.215 Individual Green Knights have been the pri-
mary driving forces for enforcement of most of the breakthrough and 
precedent-setting lawsuits enforcing environmental laws.216 Statutes are 
written, agencies are created to implement the statutory policies, and— 
faced with the traditional ability of regulated industries to constrain 
regulatory agencies—citizen groups have to fight a chronic battle to 
push agencies and courts to enforce the laws as written.217
 Individual Green Knights have generally been driven by idealism, 
philosophy, and science, not by prospects for personal financial enrich-
ment. Green Knights like Aldo Leopold,218 Rachel Carson,219 Jane 
Goodall,220 Ralph Nader,221 and Dian Fossey,222 are some of the exam-
                                                                                                                      
214 Zygmunt J.B. Plater et al., Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law, 
and Society 73 (3d ed. 2004). The first Earth Day in 1970 was the idea of such an indi-
vidual. 
215 For an excellent history of the creation and evolution of environmental law, specifi-
cally as it pertains to national parks, see Joseph L. Sax, Mountains Without Handrails: 
Reflections on the National Parks (1980). 
216 The National Environmental Policy Act, for example, has never been actively en-
forced by the federal government against the federal agencies that were its primary ad-
dressees. Plater et al., supra note 214, at 477. Many other statutes have had their primary 
enforcement from voluntary citizen efforts rather than official enforcement. See James R. 
May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10 Widener L. Rev. 1, 
2 (2003). 
217 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Dealing with Dumb and Dumber: The Continuing Mission of Citi-
zen Environmentalism, 20 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 9, 26–27 (2005). 
218 See generally Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (1949). 
219 See generally Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (1962). 
220 See generally Jane Goodall, In the Shadow of Man (rev. ed. 1988). 
221 See generally Ralph Nader, Unsafe At Any Speed (1965). 
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ples of the tradition, inspiring pioneering laws protecting the environ-
ment, beginning with the very American idea of national parks.223 The 
National Forest system, laws protecting migratory birds and raptors, the 
Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the 
ban on DDT are just a small part of their accomplishments.224  
 Sadly, however, no individual Green Knight has come forward to 
protect great whales in the Urban Sea. There indeed are a number of 
whale interest organizations among the community of “Ocean NGOs” — 
the amalgam of NMFS-licensed whale researchers, non-profit corpora-
tions, commercial fishermen associations, and other miscellaneous enti-
ties that evince an interest in whales and other marine mammals.225 
However, despite the horrific harm and threat of extinction for great 
whales that result from commercial fisheries’ practices, in the author’s 
observation, most of these organizations have been markedly hesitant to 
confront the commercial interests that cause whale entanglement, and 
sometimes take positions disfavoring common sense protections af-
forded whales by law.226
 The refusal of Ocean NGOs to demand that NMFS and state fish-
ing agencies license only whale-safe fishing gear, including non-
entangling vertical lines, is a prime example of how professional actors 
                                                                                                                      
222 See generally Dian Fossey, Gorillas in the Mist (1983). According to many 
sources, the last words in Fossey’s journal were, “When you realize the value of all life, you 
dwell less on what is past and concentrate more on the preservation of the future.” See, e.g., 
Diane Toroian Keaggy, Who Would You Invite?, St. Louis Dispatch, Apr. 7, 2007, at 4. 
223 George Catlin, a Western artist in the 1830s, is generally credited with first express-
ing the idea that there should be “a nation’s Park containing man and beast” which ulti-
mately led to the creation of the National Park system. Isaac Kantor, Ethnic Cleansing and 
America’s Creation of National Parks, 28 Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev. 41, 45 (2007). See 
generally Linda Lear, Rachel Carson: Witness for Nature (1997) (explaining how the 
publication of Carson’s Silent Spring lead to the U.S. ban on DDT). 
224 An incomplete list of environmental laws that allow for citizen enforcement would 
number more than a dozen; the author believes that citizen action may have spurred the 
creation of many of these. See Plater et al., supra note 214, at 407 & n.38. 
225 See, e.g., Conservation Alliance for Seafood Solutions, Who We Are, http://www.so- 
lutionsforseafood.org/whoweare (last visited Apr. 25, 2009) (showing a list of ocean-
centric organizations working with the seafood industry); Massachusetts Ocean Partner-
ship, Current Partners, http://www.massoceanpartnership.org/partners.html (last visited 
Apr. 25, 2009) (providing a list of organizations in the Massachusetts Ocean Partnership). 
226 This includes their opposition to the enforcement of the ESA and MMPA prohibi-
tions against individual commercial fishermen for entanglements. The author had to sub-
poena NGO employees to testify as expert witnesses at a federal trial where the Massachu-
setts fishing agency was being sued as responsible for unlawful whale entanglements. See 
generally Strahan v. Pritchard, 473 F. Supp. 2d 230 (D. Mass. 2007). These witnesses claimed 
that sinking ground-line would save whales from entanglement although no one could 
provide any example of a whale ever being entangled directly in floating ground-line. See 
id. at 238–39. 
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in marine issues align their positions with commercial interests. Off the 
record, informed members of these organizations identify vertical buoy 
lines on lobster pots and fixed gill nets as the critical element in whale 
entanglement, and the optimal object for stringent regulation to end 
the cruelty, injuries, and death caused by entanglement. Publicly, how-
ever, they shrink from efforts to enforce strict industry compliance with 
the ESA. 
 As noted in this essay, vertical buoy lines pose the prime entangle-
ment threat to whales, but NGOs have deferred to industry and NMFS 
preference for the questionable theory that requiring sinking horizon-
tal ground-lines should be the focus of regulatory efforts to protect the 
whales, avoiding the obvious measure of vertical line regulation. In on-
going citizen litigation seeking to enforce ESA section 9 prohibitions 
against placement of vertical buoy lines, moreover, it has not been pos-
sible to get NGO testimony in support of those facts.227
 The question is raised why NMFS would require lobster pot fish-
erman each to spend a good deal of money substituting sinking 
ground-line for existing ground-line without compelling proof that it 
works.228 Why too does industry accept an NMFS directive making it 
spend hundreds of thousands of dollars for a red herring, an unproven 
fix, in the absence of a lawsuit?229 In part it may be an instance of 
                                                                                                                      
 
227 Representatives of the Provincetown Center for Coastal Studies, the New England 
Aquarium, and the Humane Society of the United States were subpoenaed to testify at trial 
in both Strahan v. Pritchard and Strahan v. Holmes. They were asked repeatedly to speculate 
on whether or not whales are currently being entangled either in Massachusetts or other 
state coastal waters. Each testified that they did not know and refused to even speculate on 
the possibility. See Strahan v. Holmes, 595 F. Supp. 2d 161, 163–64 (D. Mass. 2009); 
Pritchard, 473 F. Supp. 2d, at 236–38. 
228 Congress was lobbied by NMFS and the Ocean NGOs to buy sinking ground-line for 
the commercial fishing industry. See Memorandum from Laura Ludwig, Bottom Line Project 
Director, Gulf of Maine Lobster Foundation, to all Maine state and federal lobstermen (Dec. 
14, 2007), available at http://www.gomlf.org/docs/Survey_Letter_and_FAQ_12_07_final.pdf. 
It appropriated millions of dollars for the buyout. The International Federation of Animal 
Welfare (IFAW) (known for its campaign against Newfoundland seal hunts) partnered with 
the MDMF to administer the distribution of the money to commercial fishermen. The IFAW 
has zealously maintained the need for sinking ground-lines and has opposed NMFS focusing 
on vertical buoy lines. In January 2008, it also hosted a conference for commercial fishermen 
in Boston, Massachusetts to discuss the cost, problems, and alleged benefits associated with 
converting to sinking ground-line. See Press Release, Int’l Fed’n of Animal Welfare [IFAW], 
IFAW and Atlantic Offshore Lobstermen’s Association to Host Whale Friendlier Lobster Gear 
Summit ( Jan. 3, 2008), available at http://www.ifaw.org/ifaw_asia_pacific/media_center/ 
press_releases/01_03_2008_17390.php. 
229 In the written comments submitted to NMFS’s draft Environmental Impact State-
ment and, and during the comment period for the draft 2007 ALWTRP, there is not a sin-
gle letter from a licensed commercial fisherman or any established NGO complaining that 
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NMFS selecting the most easily accommodated adjustment—a simple 
substitution of one line type that works in effectively the same manner 
as existing lines—for which, moreover, the federal government could 
be expected to subsidize the cost.230 In addition, the industry and 
NMFS may not want to set a precedent where commercial fisheries are 
aggressively targeted to comply with environmental laws. 
 The sinking ground-line theory originated from a negotiated proc-
ess between commercial fisherman and the Massachusetts Division of 
Marine Fisheries (MDMF), with the active collaboration of several 
Ocean NGOs, in the working group ordered by the court in Strahan v. 
Coxe. The MDMF chose employees of the New England Aquarium 
(NEA), the Provincetown Center for Coastal Studies (CCS), and two 
fishermen to be its representatives on this working group.231 The judge’s 
order in Coxe required the working group to produce a recommenda-
tion to the court on how fixed gear could be made safer for right 
whales—with no reference to other endangered whales.232 A one-vote 
majority—an alliance between the state parties (NEA, CCS, MDMF), 
commercial fishermen, and the Conservation Law Foundation 
(CLF),233 a major NGO—recommended the use of sinking ground-
lines, with continuation of disentangling attempts for entangled right 
whales, and data collection in right whale aerial sighting surveys that 
would be done by the CCS and NEA under contract to the MDMF.234 
Dissents came from the author, the Sierra Club, the HSUS, and an in-
dependent scientist. 
 The Strahan v. Coxe lawsuit then ended in 2001 after the judge ac-
cepted a joint 2001 intervention motion from CLF and the Massachu-
                                                                                                                      
there was no factual basis to assert that sinking ground-lines reduce the threat to great 
whales. Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations; Atlantic 
Large Whale Take Reduction Plan Regulations, 72 Fed. Reg. 57,104, 57,132–36 (Oct. 5, 
2007) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 229, 635, 648) (showing that no party challenged the fac-
tual basis for the ground-line changes). 
230 See 50 C.F.R. § 229.32(c)(1)(ii)(D)–(E) (2008); Dan McKiernan, Lobstermen Gear-up 
with Whale-safe Lines: Federal Grant Subsidizes Replacement Line, DMF News, Second Quarter 
2004—Third Quarter 2004, available at http://www.mass.gov/dfwele/dmf/public-ations/ 
dmfn_q3_04.pdf. 
231 Court Orders Additional Right Whale Protection Measures, DMF News, Fourth Quarter 
1996, available at http://www.mass.gov/dfwele/dmf/publications/dmfnq496.htm. 
232 Id. 
233 The Conservation Law Foundation is an environmental law group based in Massa-
chusetts. Conservation Law Foundation, Home, http://clf.org/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2009). 
234 Every meeting of the working group was audio taped by the MDMF and copies of 
those tapes were supplied to the author. The author also attended most of the meetings. 
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setts Lobstermen’s Association (MLA).235 The court then accepted a 
five-year settlement agreement—signed by CLF, MDMF, and the MLA, 
but not the author, who maintained the litigation—adopting the work-
ing group’s one-vote majority proposal for sinking ground-line regula-
tions, plus surveys and disentanglement efforts, and dismissed the case. 
CLF initially requested more than $300,000 in attorneys’ fees but later 
withdrew the demand. The outcome was that the judge, who earlier 
had found that state licensing of entangling gear violated ESA section 
9’s prohibition, simply dismissed the case with prejudice. Massachusetts 
then instituted a remedy that lacked in scientific evidence of effective-
ness, ignored the primary role of vertical line entanglement, and only 
nominally attempted to reduce the entanglement of endangered right 
whales in state-licensed fishing gear. Other states’ fixed gear fisheries 
thereafter also agreed to a NMFS mandate for sinking ground-lines, 
which was included prospectively in the 2007 ALWTRP.236
 After the Coxe order was signed, the MDMF issued a contract to 
CCS to do aerial survey and disentanglement work,237 and provided 
grants to the NEA for further research.238 The commercial industry 
then successfully lobbied Congress to fund lobstermen’s conversion to 
sinking ground-lines, in the program managed by the International 
Federation of Animal Welfare.239
 In 2008, two Ocean NGOs—the Whale and Dolphin Conservation 
Society and the Ocean Conservancy—engaged in a campaign with the 
                                                                                                                      
235 The CLF and the MLA intervened in a joint effort to terminate the action after the 
author insisted on going to trial. In the author’s opinion, the CLF was a “Trojan Horse” 
plaintiff—an intervening plaintiff who seeks to serve the interests of the current defen-
dant—entering the case to help the state get a resolution in its favor by posing as the re-
quired plaintiff for a settlement deal. See Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 157, 161, 171–72 
(1st Cir. 1997); see also Strahan v. Pritchard, 473 F. Supp. 2d 230, 233 (D. Mass. 2007) (dis-
cussing the outcome of Strahan v. Coxe). 
236 Diane Borgaard et al., Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., Guide to The 
Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduction Plan 3 (2008), available at http://www.nero. 
noaa.gov/whaletrp/plan/ALWTRPGuide.pdf. In the author’s opinion, Maine and other 
states made formal protests of the requirement, but filed no administrative appeals, to estab-
lish an appearance that the rule represents a middle-ground compromise. See John H. 
Cushman Jr., Lobstermen See Threat in Whale Protection Plan, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1997, at A10. 
237 Erin Burke & Daniel McKiernan, Mass. Div. of Marine Fisheries, Right Whale 
Conservation Program: 2006 Projects and Accomplishments 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/dfwele/dmf/programsandprojects/rwcp_2006.pdf. 
238 See David C. Hoover, Massachusetts’ Actions that Help Protect the Northern Right Whale, 
DMF News, Second Quarter 1996, available at http://www.mass.gov/dfwele/dmf/publica- 
tions/dmfnq296.htm. 
239 See Memorandum from Laura Ludwig, supra note 228. At an informal press event, 
Senator Edward Kennedy handed a symbolic check to the IFAW president and an industry 
representative from the MLA. McKiernan, supra note 230. 
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Massachusetts Lobstermen’s Association to promote the Massachusetts 
lobster industry as environmentally safe because of its use of sinking 
ground-lines.240 The parties to the campaign hope to convince the pub-
lic to buy Massachusetts lobsters as a “green alternative” to lobsters 
caught by Canadian and Maine fisheries, which are not required to use 
sinking ground-lines.241
 Some of the reasons for the political passivity and avoidance of sci-
entific data by the agencies and some—though not all—NGOs are read-
ily apparent. The commercial fishing industry enjoys well-organized po-
litical representation in Congress and in coastal states.242 The industry 
and its coalitions exercise substantial influence upon state marine fish-
ing agencies and NMFS itself.243 The industry’s political heft is discerni-
ble in financial “greenmail” grants to certain NGOs from oil companies 
and developers in exchange for nonconfrontation on issuance of poten-
tially threatening development permits.244 Because most financial sup-
port for marine research comes from entities responsive to exploitative 
uses of the ocean—primarily NMFS, the U.S. Navy, and the federal Min-
                                                                                                                      
240 Press Release, Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society, Ocean Conservancy, 
Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society and Massachusetts Lobstermen Launch “Massa-
chusetts Lobster Fishing: The Right Way” ( July 3, 2008), available at www.wdcs-na.org/ 
 downloads/MassLobsterJuly08.pdf. The press release states that they—along with the 
Massachusetts Lobstermen’s Association and Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries—
are “working with local restaurants, fish markets and seafood dealers to ensure that resi-
dents and visitors know to buy locally caught lobster.” Id. 
241 See id.; Alan Burke, Green Lobster Bands Mark Whale-Safe Fishing, Gloucester daily 
Times Online, July 8, 2008, available at http://www.gloucestertimes.com/punews/local_ 
story_190110942.html. The MLA fishermen now put “green bands” on their lobsters to 
identify them in the marketplace as “whale safe,” as affirmed by the NGOs. Massachusetts 
Lobster Fishing: The Right Way, Right Whale News, August 2008, at 1, 4 (stating that “[a] 
new labeling and education program in Massachusetts will encourage businesses and con-
sumers to buy lobsters caught locally, using fishing practices that are safer for whales”). 
242 See James M. Acheson, Lobster and Groundfish Management in the Gulf of Maine: A Ra-
tional Choice Perspective, 65 Hum. Org. 240, 240, 249 (2006); Walter W. Fondren III, Coastal 
Conservation Association, http://www.joincca.org/TIDE/Stand%20Up.html (last visited 
Apr. 25, 2009). In 2008, Massachusetts passed an act that, in the author’s opinion, protects 
commercial fishing as valuable to the state, with insignificant attention given to protecting 
marine wildlife from development. See 2008 Mass. Acts 143. 
243 See Acheson, supra note 242, at 240, 249; Fondren, supra note 242. 
244 See Patrick Anderson, LNG Port Operator’s Donations Go Beyond Minimums, Gloucester 
Daily Times Online, June 9, 2008, available at http://www.massenergy.com/news/Glouster 
DailyTimes-2008-06-09-LNG_port_operators_donations_go_beyond%20_minimums.pdf. In 
2008, two international liquid natural gas (LNG) companies (Neptune LNG LLC and Excel-
erate Energy LLC) seeking to develop LNG port facilities in Massachusetts each agreed to 
pay $23.5 million to a consortium of commercial fishermen and NGOs in exchange for the 
issuing of required permits by state and federal review agencies. This arrangement was a 
stated requirement for the state to approve its permit for the project. See id. 
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eral Management Service—successful research grant applicants reflect a 
strong incentive toward research paths that do not conflict with com-
mercial interests. 
 A number of the NGOs involved in ocean issues—soliciting mil-
lions of dollars annually from well-intentioned contributors to their ap-
peals for ocean conservation—have chosen to develop and maintain 
acquiescent “partnership” relationships with the commercial fishing 
industry.245 Some Ocean NGOs supported the 1994 MMPA Amend-
ment scheme of granting blanket immunity to fishermen who entangle 
whales. The linkage has been explained as a battle between which of 
the two becomes endangered: whales or fishermen.246
 The issue is not that such relationships are inappropriate per se, 
but rather that they are inappropriate if they derogate efforts for con-
serving threatened marine life. That NGOs have avoided eliminating, 
reducing, or redesigning vertical buoy lines is only one primary indica-
tion that such relationships are inappropriate. In response, a justifica-
tion voiced by these NGOs is that no regulation at all would be possible 
if politically opposed by the industry, so that NGOs must take whatever 
they can get as better than nothing.247 NGOs that conduct whale re-
search, in particular, are understandably sensitive to the commercial 
fishing industry.248 Researchers rely on receiving ESA and MMPA per-
mits issued by NMFS, and need to be attuned to the agency’s political 
position and orientation. Many professional field researchers rely on 
commercial whale-watch operations, which typically have originated 
from or been linked to commercial fishing operations, as “platforms of 
opportunity” for their observations and research and as a source of 
supplementary funding.249 As with the fisheries regulatory agencies 
and many Ocean NGOs, the resulting professional conflict-avoiding 
alignment of researchers with the fishing industry reflects a symbiosis. 
                                                                                                                      
245 See Conservation Alliance for Seafood Solutions, supra note 225; Massachusetts 
Ocean Partnership, Current Partners, supra note 225. 
246 See Tora Johnson, Entanglements: The Intertwined Fates of Whales and 
Fishermen 4, 264 (2005). 
247 See IFAW, supra note 228 (noting that collaboration between conservationists and 
industry is necessary). 
248 See id. 
249 See Whale Watching Tours, Whale Watch trips from Cape Ann, North of Boston, 
http://www.yankeefleet.com/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2009). See generally Stacie Koslovsky, Wan-
dering Whale Watchers: The Effectiveness of Whale Watches as a Platform of Opportunity for 
Data Collection (May 2008) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Duke University), available at 
http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/10161/516/1/MP_smk20_a_200805.pdf. 
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IV. A New Paradigm for Whale Survival in the Urban Sea: 
Whales as Protected Features of the Urban Sea,  
Like Mountains or Rivers 
A. What Is to Be Done Generally? 
 Great whales should no longer be conceived merely as wildlife. 
Their legal status should be as protected essential features of the envi-
ronment, like notable mountains or river valleys that are preserved 
solely for their aesthetic value.250 They should formally be treated as 
“Twenty-Ton Canaries” by federal and state governments, protected not 
just for their own welfare, but also to ensure the generic welfare of the 
whole ocean ecosystem. Whales’ current status as a “living resource” 
managed by agencies designed to support commercial fisheries must be 
changed if great whales are to be adequately protected or expected to 
survive in the long term. 
B. Remedial Propositions 
1. Transfer Management Authority for Great Whales Away from NMFS 
and Re-Task the Marine Mammal Commission to Oversee Actions 
for Protection of Great Whales. 
 Implementing a rationally based and effective conservation effort 
for great whales requires legal responsibility to be transferred to an 
agency whose employees see getting the job done as their core task. At a 
minimum, the conservation responsibilities for great whales should be 
transferred to NOAA’s National Ocean Service (NOS) or NOS’s Office 
of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management (OCRM)—established by 
the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA).251 Either would be a far 
better platform for overseeing the protection and recovery of endan-
gered whale populations.252 The ESA and MMPA state that direct re-
                                                                                                                      
 
250 See generally Jim Thorsell & Larry Hamilton, A Global Overview of Mountain Protected Ar-
eas on the World Heritage List (Int’l Union for Conservation of Nature, Working Paper No. 6, 
2002), available at http://www.unep-wcmc.org/wh/reviews/MOUNTAIN_PROTECTED_ 
AREAS.pdf; Nat’l Park Serv., National Heritage Areas Program, http://www.nps.gov/his- 
tory/heritageareas/VST/INDEX.HTM (last visited Apr. 25, 2009) (describing various “Heri-
tage Areas” that are nationally protected). 
251 Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1452 (2006);, Nat’l Ocean Serv., 
Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Manage-
ment, http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/welcome.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2009). 
252 Both of these agencies’ missions are—in their statutory charges—focused on holistic 
protection of the marine ecosystem, and neither of them license or regulate any commercial 
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sponsibility for great whales is assigned to NOAA under these acts, but 
this need does not require subdelegation to NMFS; NOAA has full statu-
tory discretion to transfer these duties to NOS from NMFS.253
 Additionally, Congress should transfer responsibilities from NMFS 
to the Marine Mammal Commission to oversee and approve issuance of 
research licenses on great whales; the adoption of MMPA take reduc-
tions plans (TRPs) and other tasks to be performed under MMPA sec-
tion 118; the issuance of ESA section 10 incidental take permits (ITPs) 
and ESA section 7 biological opinions involving great whales; and the 
appointment and administration of ESA recovery teams for the great 
whales. 
2. Transfer State Management Authority for Great Whales to a State’s 
Coastal Zone Management Office or at a Minimum to Its 
Endangered Species Agency 
 States should adopt a whale-safe standard for management of 
coastal industrial projects and state commercial fishing. Management 
responsibilities for great whales in a state’s coastal waters should be es-
tablished within that state’s Coastal Zone Management office. A whale-
safe environmental standard to be enforced pursuant to state environ-
mental review laws could indeed utilize great whales as “Twenty-Ton 
Canaries” where the status of their population’s health would be used 
to generally indicate the health of the local marine environment. The 
safety of the great whales and the overall health of the marine envi-
                                                                                                                      
activity at all. These agencies mostly conduct scientific research on the ocean environment 
and review the impacts of commercial development on the marine environment. Nat’l 
Ocean Serv., Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., NOAA’s National Ocean Service: Pro-
gram Offices, http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/programs/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2009); Nat’l 
Ocean Serv., Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., NOAA Office of Ocean and Coastal Re-
source Management: Our Programs, http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/programs/wel- 
come.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2009). The web site for NOS states that “NOAA’s National 
Ocean Service (NOS) is the nation’s premier science agency for oceans and coasts” and its 
mission is “[t]o provide science-based solutions through collaborative partnerships to address 
evolving economic, environmental, and social pressures on our oceans and coasts.” Nat’l 
Ocean Serv., Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., About the National Ocean Service, 
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/about/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2009). NOS administers the 
National Marine Sanctuaries Program. The web site for OCRM similarly emphasizes its 
mission is to protect the coastal marine environment. NOAA Office of Ocean and Coastal 
Resource Management: Our Programs, supra. 
253 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006). It could be argued that NOAA from the start 
should have assigned its MMPA and ESA duties to a subagency other than NMFS. ESA 
requires that NOAA take no action that would jeopardize the survival of listed species, and 
in weighing that choice it could have been expected that NMFS would dilute regulatory 
protections conflicting with the commercial fishing industry. See id. 
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ronment would be reinforced if every proposed marine activity was as-
sessed for its impact on great whales during any environmental review 
process. Alternatively, state jurisdiction over great whales should be 
transferred away from state agencies linked to the commercial fishing 
industry and assigned to the state agencies committed to endangered 
species protection. 
3. Vigorously Enforce the Prohibitions of the ESA, MMPA, and 
Applicable State Laws Against Commercial Fishermen Whose Gear 
Entangles Whales 
 The NMFS’s de facto offering of safe harbor to fishermen from 
ESA or MMPA enforcement must end. There is no market incentive for 
private enterprise to develop further whale-safe fishing technologies if 
commercial interests are not required to utilize them. The current 
blanket refusal by NMFS and state law enforcement agencies—and the 
Coast Guard, which has concurrent enforcement authority under 
ESA254—to prosecute fishermen whose gear entangles whales is a pri-
mary factor responsible for the continuing entanglement-related killing 
and injuring of great whales. 
4. Radically Redesign Federal and State Regulation of the Commercial 
Fishing Industries 
 No single programmatic change would better benefit the conser-
vation of the ocean’s wildlife than a radically conceived redesign and 
redirected regulation of the fishing industry, ending the jurisdiction of 
industry-oriented “private” government fishing agencies. A modern 
redesign would charge protection-focused agencies to serve the pur-
poses of ensuring that fisheries resources are not depleted by the indus-
try, that the industry will be conducted in an environmentally whale-
safe manner, and that industry will experience full review under state 
and federal environmental laws. Elements of this agenda include: (1) 
ending industry-dominated commissions that oversee fisheries agen-
cies, and changing the fisheries agencies’ core operating duty to the 
task of assuring that commercial fishing permits comply with environ-
mental protection goals; (2) retasking the function of the revised fish-
eries regulatory agencies from promoting commercial fisheries to an 
oversight duty of protecting a public resource from industry exploita-
tion; (3) ensuring, in the issuing of fishing leases to private parties, that 
                                                                                                                      
254 Id. § 1540(e)(1) (2006). 
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whale-safe and environmentally sound fishing practices are required on 
the lease-holders’ part, and that fees for fishing lease holders assist in 
offsetting the cost of environmental law compliance, including the cost 
of developing whale-safe fishing technology; (4) installing a system of 
market-based access to fisheries resources for specified areas, thereby 
ending the process of issuing annual permits for the right to fish for a 
minimal, fixed processing fee;255 and (5) giving “green fishermen” 
preference in access to state and federal fisheries resources.256
5. Impose Professional Ethical Standards on Licensed Whale 
Researchers and on NGOs Who Accept Funds to Lobby for Whale 
Conservation 
 Ethical standards of professional conduct should be enforced on 
all who are licensed under the ESA or the MMPA to conduct research 
on endangered whales.257 The need for professional ethical standards is 
especially strong for publicly funded researchers and those directly li-
censed by government agencies to do research on great whales under 
those statutes. Ethical standards for researchers need to provide public 
                                                                                                                      
255 Five-year leases could be issued for fishing in specific designated blocks of 100 
square miles, under competitive bidding processes without perennial renewals of individ-
ual fishing licenses. Leases would not be issued to individual fishermen but to collective 
groups or business interests with the financial resources to pay for environmental mitiga-
tion. The substantial revenue from such lease sales could fund scientific research to estab-
lish effective quotas. Restraints on commercial fishing practices would be spelled out in 
the individual lease agreements, rather than being imposed as government regulations. 
256 As part of any bid for a lease, bidders would include a conservation plan to insure 
that commercial fishing under the lease would not have an unacceptable impact on the 
marine environment. An offer to use innovative whale-safe technology could be part of 
that plan. The cost of conservation programs would be borne by the bidders, and they 
would be allowed to compete as to the most aggressive conservation measures. Bidders 
that make a significant commitment to “green fishing” in excess of other bidders would be 
given “green credits” to offset higher bids from “non-green” bidders. As a result, “green 
fishing” would be promoted based on individual motivation. Non-green bidders would 
over time be driven out of the market, unlikely to wait five years without fishing after a 
losing bid, to return and offer a non-green bid. If anything, the most realistic way for a new 
bidder to seize control of a leased area would be to offer an even “greener” bid than the 
current lease holder. 
257 The Wildlife Society (TWS) is an NGO that conducts a “certified wildlife biologist” 
program that requires a wildlife biologist to comply with a set of professional ethical standards 
in order to be certified. The Wildlife Society, The Wildlife Society Certification Program, 
http://joomla.wildlife.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=29&Itemid=234 
(last visited Apr. 25, 2009). The ethical standards promoted by TWS directly address the prob-
lem of a wildlife biologist becoming influenced to serve the vested interests that determine the 
funding for its research activities. The Wildlife Society, Ethics and Professional Conduct for 
Wildlife Biologists, http://joomla.wildlife.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view& 
id=72&Itemid=72 (last visited Apr. 25, 2009). 
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disclosure of field data about whales obtained in the course of licensed 
research (for example, accessibility of photographs and databases of 
whale sightings and locations). Licensed species conservation research 
should not be based on funding from commercial interests or agencies 
that promote commercial activity. 
 Ethical conduct requires that transparency standards be imposed 
on agency scientists doing research and assisting in environmental re-
views. Agency employees should not consult with commercial interests 
until reviews have been completed, and discussions with reviewing 
agency staff should be recorded and conducted under protocols that 
preserve the independence of the reviewing staff. NGOs that publicly 
advertise a commitment to protect wildlife should open themselves to 
public review and comment to insure that these purposes are served 
with objectivity and accuracy. 
 The failure to protect great whales is in no small part due to such 
failures on the part of whale researchers and advocacy NGOs. Only re-
searchers who become certified under professional ethical standards 
should be allowed to obtain research permits under the ESA or the 
MMPA. Even NGOs that professionally involve themselves with wildlife 
conservation should be subject to an ethics oversight certification. 
6. Amend the ESA and MMPA to Correct the Defects that Prevent 
These Acts from Fulfilling Their Intent to Protect Great Whales 
 The ESA and MMPA are substantively deficient in their abilities to 
protect whales.258 ESA section 9 prohibitions should be amended to 
explicitly prohibit activities in a specific habitat (for example, lobster 
pot fishing in Cape Cod Bay) that are operating in a manner as a whole 
that has resulted in numbers of killed or injured members of a listed 
species in that habitat in the past. Injunctive relief against individual 
fishermen could be issued upon a simple showing that a party was at-
tempting to conduct the prohibited activity, without any need to prove 
that a member of a listed species might be taken in the future by parties 
conducting the activity. This would compel regulated parties to apply 
for and receive ESA section 10 incidental take permits and bear the 
burden of proving the stringent requirements for avoiding killing or 
injuring listed species. 
 This change would also assist citizen suit plaintiffs in protecting 
great whales from commercial fishing as regulated by state agencies. 
                                                                                                                      
258 See generally Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361–1407 
(2006); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006). 
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Perhaps due to the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution and comity considerations, and despite the liability holding in 
Strahan v. Coxe, federal courts appear unwilling to enjoin state agencies’ 
licensing activities that incidentally take ESA-listed species. The pro-
posed change would support successful enforcement suits by expressly 
rejecting the plaintiffs’ unprovable burden of demonstrating by the 
preponderance of evidence that a specific piece of gear will more likely 
than not entangle a great whale in the future. 
7. Rethink Participation in the International Whaling Commission 
 The International Whaling Commission (IWC) is an old-school 
whaling entity, not a modern resource conservation agency. It needs to 
be replaced by a new kind of treaty organization. Until then, the 
United States should simply pull out of participation in the IWC and 
rigorously impose sanctions on whaling nations so long as the IWC 
maintains its role as a harvest-regulating agency. This current role is 
inconsistent with modern standards of treating whales as essential at-
tributes of the marine environment. The IWC should be replaced with 
a new protocol forever banning hunting of whales, establishing them 
under international law as “Twenty-Ton Canaries,” with their health 
and welfare serving as an international environmental standard for en-
suring ocean conservation. 
Conclusion 
 The “Twenty-Ton Canary” is trying to tell us something. Our na-
tion’s current operating paradigm for protecting the environment and 
preventing the irreparable loss of biodiversity and ecosystems appears 
to be insufficient as applied to great whales living in the Urban Sea of 
the United States and Canada. Great whales continue to be killed and 
injured by a number of avoidable human causes, including entangle-
ment by fixed commercial fishing gear in the Urban Sea of the United 
States and other nations where they live and breed. The avoidable 
harm continues despite the passage of the MMPA and the ESA and the 
broad support of the public for the welfare of whales. The destruction 
of the great whales is occurring as collateral damage to the exponen-
tially increasing industrial exploitation of the ocean by a nation that in 
principle reveres them and has extensively protected them under law. 
 The essential elements of the Green Knight paradigm are: (1) fo-
cused and uncompromising advocacy for the environment; (2) an 
alerted public and press who demand action; (3) willingness on the 
part of a democratic government to pass effective and comprehensive 
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environmental protection laws; (4) willingness on the part of agencies 
to incorporate the normative mandate to protect wildlife; and (5) the 
willingness of courts to force agencies and industry to protect the envi-
ronment. For the great whales, some aspect of each of these essential 
elements has simply failed to crystallize. 
 It is proposed that things must fundamentally change. The great 
whales should be legally treated as protected attributes of the environ-
ment like mountains and rivers, and no longer regulated in the cate-
gory of a harvestable living resource. NOAA should reassign great 
whales from NMFS to an agency solely interested in protecting biodi-
versity in the ocean, such as the National Ocean Service. NGOs should 
change their modus operandi to that of a Green Knight, taking respon-
sibility to develop whale-safe fishing gear and working to assure that the 
fishing industry is legally bound to use it. The great whales still await a 
Green Knight to come to their rescue. 
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